



OLD AND NEW INSURGENCY FORMS

Robert J. Bunker



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**Strategic Studies Institute
and
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
FOREWORD

This monograph develops a typology of old and new insurgency forms derived from a comprehensive review of the writings of insurgency theorists along with the inclusion of a number of schema offered by terrorism scholars. The work is unique in that no prior military theoretical efforts have been undertaken to analyze and synthesize the post-Cold War insurgency form writings that have emerged over the last 2 decades. It is apropos that these writings were greatly influenced by Strategic Studies Institute efforts dating back to the early-1990s – initially pioneered by Dr. Steven Metz, our present Director of Research – that have now come full circle with their integration in this work.

The monograph contains an introduction, sections on defining insurgency, terrorism as insurgency indications and warnings, review of insurgency typologies, a proposed insurgency typology with legacy, contemporary, emergent and potential forms, and the strategic implications for U.S. defense policy, as well as five tables, and an endnotes section. The effort by the author, Dr. Robert J. Bunker, a past Minerva Chair at our institution, benefits from his past work in the terrorism and insurgency fields of study and ongoing collaborative scholarship in articulating new forms of insurgency – especially its criminalized form now evident in Mexico – that are emerging.

While primarily a theoretical analysis, this work has direct implications for U.S. national security and strategy. It provides insights into the evolving nature of insurgency and its numerous variants as well as offering recommendations for U.S. policymakers. The strategic implications for the Department of Defense

for each form that has been identified are discussed as well as suggested U.S. responses. For this reason, the Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press hopes this monograph will be of great interest to key leaders in the U.S. Army and the Department of Defense as well as senior U.S. Government policymakers, scholars, and theorists focusing on insurgency studies themselves.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr." in a cursive script.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute and
U.S. Army War College Press

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

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these are *Studies in Gangs and Cartels*, with John P. Sullivan (Routledge, 2013), and *Red Teams and Counterterrorism Training* with Stephen Sloan, (University of Oklahoma, 2011); and edited (and co-edited) works including *Global Criminal and Sovereign Free Economies and the Demise of the Western Democracies* (Routledge, 2014), *Criminal Insurgencies in Mexico and the Americas: The Gangs and Cartels Wage War* (Routledge, 2012), *Narcos Over the Border: Gangs, Cartels and Mercenaries* (Routledge, 2011), *Criminal-States and Criminal-Soldiers* (Routledge, 2008), *Networks, Terrorism and Global Insurgency* (Routledge, 2005), and *Non-State Threats and Future Wars* (Routledge, 2002). Dr. Bunker holds university degrees in political science, government, social science, anthropology-geography, behavioral science, and history.

SUMMARY

While the study of insurgency extends well over 100 years and has its origins in the guerrilla and small wars of the 19th century and beyond, almost no cross modal analysis—that is, dedicated insurgency form typology identification—has been conducted. Until the end of the Cold War, the study of insurgency focused primarily on separatist and Marxist derived forms with an emphasis on counterinsurgency practice aimed at those forms rather than on identifying what differences and interrelationships existed. The reason for this is that the decades-long Cold War struggle subsumed many diverse national struggles and tensions into a larger paradigm of conflict—a free, democratic, and capitalist West versus a totalitarian, communist, and centrally planned East.

With the end of the Cold War and the resulting ideological and economic implosion of the Soviet Union, post-Cold War insurgency typologies began to emerge because a need existed to understand where this component of the new global security environment was heading. Over 2 decades of research and writing have been focused on this endeavor by what is a relatively small number of insurgency practitioners and/or theorists. In addition, the works of some contemporary terrorism scholars are also relevant to this topical area of focus.

For this monograph to identify what can be considered new forms of insurgency that are developing, an appreciation for and understanding of earlier insurgency forms must also be articulated. With these thoughts in mind, this monograph will initially discuss what an insurgency is and some Western viewpoints on it, describe how terrorism analysis can potentially

serve an indications and warnings (I&W) function, provide a literature review of the post-Cold War insurgency typologies that exist, create a proposed insurgency typology divided into legacy, contemporary, and emergent and potential insurgency forms, and finally provide strategic implications for U.S. defense policy as they relate to each of these forms. The work will also utilize a number of tables for organizational purposes and an endnotes section for scholarly citation requirements.

Pertaining to the insurgency and terrorism literature reviews conducted in this manuscript, the following terrorism and insurgency forms—form name(s), author(s), and year of publication—were analyzed in creating the final forms typology.

Terrorism Forms.

- Anarchist, anti-colonial, new-left, religious extremism (Rapoport, 2001)
- Utopian vision (Kaplan, 2007)
- Ethnic, religious, ideological (Schnabel and Gunaratna, 2006, 2015)

Insurgency Forms.

- Commercial and spiritual (Metz, 1993)
- People's war, Cuban-style focquismo, urban insurrection (Metz, 1993)
- Defensive (Cable, 1993 in Metz, 1995)
- Reactionary, subversive (camouflaged) (Metz, 1995)
- Liberation, separatist, reform, warlord (Clapham, 1998)
- Apolitical (Sloan, 1999)
- Economic (Thom, 1999)

- Resource-based (Cilliers, 2000)
- Revolutionary warfare, wars of national liberation, urban, superpower (Beckett, 2001)
- Globalized Islamist (Kilcullen, 2004)
- National, liberation (Metz and Millen, 2004)
- Anarchist, egalitarian, traditionalist (reactionary-traditionalist), apocalyptic-utopian, secessionist, reformist, preservationist, commercial (Metz, 1993; O'Neill, 2005)
- Virtual (Thomas, 2006)
- Virtual (Hammes, 2007 in Metz, 2007)
- Criminal (Sullivan, 2008)
- Violent new religious movements (Lauder, 2009)
- Urban (Sullivan and Elkus, 2009)
- Resource control (Tarr, 2011)
- Revolution, separatism, resistance (Jones, 2011)
- Virtual (Sloan, 2011)
- Plutocratic (Bunker, 2011)
- Proto-state, nonpolitical, state destruction (Metz, 2012)
- Urban (Kilcullen, 2013)
- Chinese state (Jones and Johnson, 2013)
- Singularity (Rectenwald, 2013)
- Radical Christian (Metz, 2015)

Derived from this analysis, the following insurgency forms with their starting dates in () have been identified as well as the strategic implications of each form for U.S. defense policy.

Legacy Insurgency Forms.

Anarchist (1880s). Generally violent, anarchism has only been viewed as a form of terrorism (Rapoport, 2001) because the end state sought is governmental—

even state – destruction. No replacement government or seizure of the state is being attempted nor is any form of subversion or co-option of state institutions or the parallel building of a shadow state taking place. Still, O’Neill (2005) designates this as an insurgency form and the insurgency outcome of state-destruction exists in a later typology created by Metz (2012).

Strategic implications: None. This legacy insurgency form is an anachronism with the threat potentials downgraded to that of sporadic periods of local unrest being generated by protesters outside of political conventions and financial summits and characterized by vandalism, aggravated assault, and arson. This is solely a U.S. domestic law enforcement issue focusing on riot control, investigation of criminal activities, and limited counterterrorism response. No U.S. military response is required.

Separatist – Internal and External (1920s). This insurgency form encompasses both separation from local authority – such as the original Irish Republican Army (IRA) gaining Irish independence from the United Kingdom in 1921 – and the separation from foreign authority as took place in numerous regions during the decolonial period after the Second World War. Numerous theorists have identified this insurgency form, ranging from Cable’s (1993) defensive articulation through a number of others into Jones’s (2011) separatist and resistance types.

Strategic implications: Limited. This insurgency form now takes place only sporadically and to some extent has been replaced by more traditional secession ballot initiatives as have or may be seen in the future as taking place in Scotland, Catalonia, Flanders, and other locales. Still, the insurgencies of the 1990s that took place in the former Yugoslavia and the more

recent secession of South Sudan in 2011 suggest this legacy form has not faded away. A possible U.S. military response may be required depending on the specific international incident taking place.

Maoist People's (1930s). The most identifiable insurgency form is derived from Mao Zedong's principles found in his 1937 work, *On Guerrilla Warfare*. This form, also known as "people's war," utilizes peasant armies that are drawn upon for an integrated and protracted politico-military phase strategy of eventual state takeover. A shadow or proto-state is created in parallel to the pre-existing one being targeted for elimination. This form has been identified by Metz (1993) as people's war, by Beckett (2001) as revolutionary warfare, by O'Neill (2005) as egalitarian, and Schnabel and Gunaratna (2006; 2015) as ideological.

Strategic implications: None. This legacy insurgency form is defunct. No U.S. military response is required.

Urban Left (Late-1960s). This insurgency form has been identified by a number of theorists and, as previously mentioned, is a continuation of earlier Marxist politico-military concepts with a more urbanized emphasis. Peasants no longer fight in the countryside or surround cities—their successors now engage in terrorist tactical actions within those cities. Metz's (1993) urban insurrection—devoid the Iranian experience, Beckett's (2001) urban and superpower based Soviet proxy component, Rapoport's (2001) new-left, and Schnabel and Gunaratna's (2006; 2015) ideological (which spans the earlier Marxist form and this one) all address this form.

Strategic implications: None to limited. This legacy insurgency form appears to be defunct, therefore, no U.S. military response is required. However, the pro-

motion of such potentials by the Bolivarian alliance exists and could be facilitated by Russian, Iranian and Hezbollah, and/or Chinese support. Still, if this insurgency form should reappear, the impact is estimated to be limited. It would require varying U.S. Government agency involvement based on a situational response.

Contemporary Insurgency Forms.

Radical Islamist (1979). The Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 and the ensuing 444-day U.S. Embassy hostage crisis ushered in a new insurgency form derived from the perception that mosque and state are inexorably intertwined. The radical Islamist form has two variants—one Shia and the other Sunni based—and stems from the fact that Islam never underwent a historical reformation which ushered in secular political thought and a separation of the spheres of church (or mosque) and state. Scholars recognizing this insurgency form are Metz (1995) reactionary, Rapoport (2001) religious extremism, Kilcullen (2004) globalized Islamist, O'Neill (2005) reactionary-traditionalist, and Schnabel and Gunaratna (2006; 2015) religious.

Strategic implications: Significant. Groups involved include Hezbollah, al-Qaeda, and the Islamic State. Of all the presently active insurgency forms, this one has the most significant impact on U.S. defense policy as witnessed by the years of deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq and the ongoing operations in Syria, Yemen, and numerous other locales. This insurgency form requires either federal law enforcement or the military (typically) as the designated lead. An all-of-government approach is required to mitigate and defeat this insurgency form which possesses a terrorism component—utilizing both large scale and lone

wolf attacks—representing a direct threat to the U.S. homeland.

Liberal Democratic (1989). The removal of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, the end of Communist rule in Eastern Europe thereafter, and the eventual dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991 marked not only the end to the Cold War but also the power of pluralist uprisings as the Polish Solidarity shipyard workers have shown. That liberal democracy could provide the basis for an insurgency form has been noted by both Beckett (2001), as the American component of the Cold War superpower based conflict, and also later by O'Neill (2005), more specifically within his pluralist form designation.

Strategic implications: Mixed (beneficial). This insurgency form should be viewed as an opportunity to extend democratic values rather than as an actual or potential threat of some sort to the United States or its allies. A variety of U.S. Government agencies may provide indirect and/or direct facilitation of such insurgencies. The one downside of this insurgency form is unintended second and third order effects—for example, U.S. support to the mostly defunct Free Syrian Army (FSA) inadvertently strengthened the Islamic State (IS) by helping to weaken the Assad regime.

Criminal (Early-2000s). Elements and components of this insurgency form have been projected and identified by numerous scholars: Metz's (1993) commercial, Clapham's (1998) warlord, Sloan's (1999) apolitical, Thom's (1999) economic, Cilliers's (2000) resource-based, Tarr's (2011) resource control, and Metz's later (2012) non-political. Of these various articulations, Sullivan's (2008) criminal designation—directly derived from Metz's 1993 perceptions—has become the dominant one as it relates to the insurgent-like

activities of the gangs and cartels in Mexico and Latin America.

Strategic implications: Limited to moderate. Typically, the groups involved in this insurgency form—Colombian and Mexican cartels, Central American gangs, and the Italian mafia—are viewed as a law enforcement concern. However, some of the African warlords and the more operationally capable cartel groups, such as *Los Zetas* and CJNG (*Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación*), have overmatch capability to any law enforcement response. For the United States, the response to this insurgency form requires either federal law enforcement (typically) or the military as the designated lead. An all-of-government approach is required to mitigate and defeat this insurgency form that springs out of Mexico and is bringing corruption into U.S. border zones along with sporadic incidents of narco-terrorism.

Plutocratic (2008). Of all of the insurgency forms offered in this monograph, this may be one of the most contentious. It specifically views the rise of globalized capital devoid of any ties to the state—in essence, representative of an emerging form of 21st century postmodern capitalism—in direct conflict with earlier forms of 20th century state moderated capitalism promoted by liberal democratic governments. It views the rise of stateless multinational corporations, and the global elites (.001% to 1%) they serve as the major stakeholders, as insider insurgent threats to the international order. This insurgent form serves as a corollary to the preceding criminal form and represents another variant to Metz's (1993) commercial articulation postulated by Bunker (2011).

Strategic implications: None presently. The U.S. military has no current role in the response to the rise of predatory global capitalism and the emerging “sov-

oreign free” entities engaging in it. Rather, varying governmental agencies with a legalistic and economic mandate will be required to promote state moderated capitalist values and laws. Federal law enforcement agencies will be tasked to support such efforts as they relate to financial crimes, tax avoidance, and related offenses.

Emergent and Potential Insurgency Forms.

Blood Cultist (Emergent). The existence of this type of insurgency form has been recognized by a number of scholars (O’Neill, 2005; Kaplan, 2007; Lauder, 2009) primarily within the last decade and ultimately represents a fusion of criminality, spirituality, and barbarism. It is most recognizable with recent Islamic State activity involving mass ritual beheadings, crucifixions, child rape, and related atrocities and their “end of days” type of pursuits. Attributes of this insurgency form can also be found with the *La Familia Michoacana* (LFM) and *Los Caballeros Templarios* (The Knight’s Templars) cartels in Mexico which engage in Christian cultish behaviors and elements of *Los Zetas* and *Cartel del Golfo* that are involved in extreme forms of *Santa Muerte* worship which seek supernatural protection, death magic spells, power, and riches.

Strategic implications: Limited to moderate. This insurgency form can be viewed as a mutation of either radical Islam and/or rampant criminality, as found in parts of Latin America and Africa, into dark spirituality based on cult-like behaviors and activities involving rituals and even human sacrifice. To respond to this insurgency form, either federal law enforcement or the military will be the designated lead depending on the specific international incident taking place. An all-of-government approach will be required to

mitigate and defeat this insurgency form which has terrorism (and narco-terrorism) elements that represent direct threats—especially concerning the Islamic State—to the U.S. homeland.

Neo-urban (Emergent). This emergent insurgency form is not a resurgence of the old *urban left* form dating back to the late-1960s that was derived from small numbers of politicized leftist-leaning urban guerrillas. Rather, this form is post-modernistic in orientation with concerns over feral cities and sprawling slums—such as in Karachi, Rio, Lagos, and Nairobi—controlled by inner city gangs, local militias, organized crime and private security groups. Theoretically, it can be considered a kludge of Metz’s *commercial* (1993) and *urban insurrection* (1993) forms updated by means of Sullivan and Elkus’ *urban* (2009) and Kilcullen’s *urban* (2013) focused insurgencies writings. Kilcullen’s competitive control focus is further indicative of fractured sovereignty and state deconstruction. It is thus conceptually allied with the neo-Medievalism works of Hedley Bull (1977), Jorg Friedrichs (2001) and Phil Williams (2008). This insurgency form has become the focus of present “megacities issue” studies by U.S. Army insurgency experts and is highlighted by such works as the Army Chief of Staff’s Strategic Studies Group/Concept Team’s *Megacities and the United States Army* (2014) and William Adamson’s “Megacities and the US Army” published in *Parameters* (2015).

Strategic implications: Moderate to significant potentials. At its more benign levels of criminality, this is a law enforcement concern, but when public safety resources are overwhelmed and internal stability is threatened it increasingly becomes a military concern. A major issue is governmental inability to effectively control sprawling slums and the possible role of gangs, militias, and organized crime as a stabilizing

and norm inducing force. Of further concern is the fact that this insurgency form readily has the capacity to merge with the *criminal* insurgency form. An all-of-government approach is required for megacities which are in advanced stages of this insurgency form because it ultimately signifies that urban competitive control has shifted to informal networks and non-state entities.

Virtual (Potential; Near to Midterm). Initial thinking on this potential form solely focused on its being an adjunct to physical based insurgency. It was simply viewed as a means of virtual communications – a more efficient type of “propaganda of the deed” or cyber *levée en masse* (form of mobilization) – which was initially discussed by Thomas (2006 and 2007), Hammes (2007 in Metz), and Betz (2008). The initial “adjunct to physical insurgency” viewpoint has since been challenged by new perceptions articulated by Sloan (2011). He sees the virtual realm as its own reality in which insurgency can now be waged – a view shared by this author given his past collaborative work with Sloan. As a result, this potential insurgency form is reflective of a changing 21st century battlefield composed of dual-dimensional space-time attributes, derived from humanspace and cyberspace, with its increasing virtual overlay placed over our physical reality.

Strategic implications: Initially limited but increasing over time. This potential insurgency form spans a basic criminal or terrorist act (e.g., recruiting and fundraising for the Islamic State) through increasing levels of sophistication such as the release of classified governmental documents (e.g., WikiLeaks), the shutdown of components of a state’s public and private infrastructure, and actual destructive cyberattacks. Ultimately, it may represent an entirely new component

of insurgency taking place both in cyberspace and eventually as a component of dual-dimensional (e.g., humanspace and cyberspace) operations. An initial response to virtual support of terrorists and insurgents will need to come from federal law enforcement and specialized computer forensic and cyber task forces. More systemic and malicious type attacks, approaching what can be considered *virtual* insurgency levels, will result in military and intelligence agency cyber forces also being utilized for response purposes.

Chinese Authoritarianism (Potentials; Near to Mid-term). China is now not only in the process of industrializing, but has been running a massive mercantilist-like trade surplus, and investing in countries across the world in order to gain access to raw materials and resources. In addition to China's Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and "Belt and Road" initiatives in Asia and within the former lands traversed by the old Silk Road, it has made significant political and economic investment inroads into both Africa and Latin America. The insurgency potentials identified by Jones and Johnson (2013) can thus been seen vis-à-vis the U.S. "Pivot to Asia" and the ensuing engagement and containment strategy being directed at China. Steven Metz has voiced an opposing view on the viability of such a potential insurgency form.

Strategic implications: Significant potentials. Given that China is rising as a great power and now has global economic and political interests and reach, this proposed insurgency form could in the near to midterm represent a threat to U.S. national security. However, significant barriers to implementation exist stemming from a lack of a transnational ideology that can solidify ties to insurgents. Ongoing monitoring and analysis by the intelligence community of

such threat potentials is warranted for strategic early warning purposes. Additionally, behavioral and environmental shaping by the Department of State and Department of Defense to promote desirable futures should be implemented.

Cyborg and Spiritual Machine (Potentials; Long Term/ Science Fiction-like). This insurgency form can be considered a “blue sky” scenario, but must still be considered for its potentially dire implications. This insurgency form is derived from the merging of the spiritual (Metz, 1993) and plutocratic (Bunker, 2011) forms and has also been raised in neo-Marxist singularity form thinking (Rectenwald, 2013). Such concerns have been the lore of science fiction for decades and can be found in Isaac Asimov’s “Three Laws of Robotics” meant to protect humanity from such threats through the dystopian Terminator series in which the self-aware Skynet computer system targets humanity for eradication.

Strategic implications: None presently. This proposed insurgency form is viewed as having long-term threat potentials, although it is presently science fiction-like in nature. The appropriate U.S. response is achieved through the Defense Science Board monitoring of technologies related to cybernetic implants and strong artificial intelligence and the shaping of policies and laws that promote democratic and constitutional values.

OLD AND NEW INSURGENCY FORMS

The United States Army is still in a process of drawing down from over a decade of deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq, primarily focused on stability and support operations (SASO), counter-insurgency operations (COIN), and related mission sets. Compared to earlier soldier and contractor commitments and periodic surges, the present numbers are relatively low with about 10,000 personnel in Afghanistan and slightly over 3,000 personnel in Iraq.¹ However, new deployments are possible due to the recent battlefield successes and territorial acquisitions of the Islamic State (IS) in Iraq, Syria, Libya and its expansion and takeover of the old al-Qaeda global terrorist and insurgent network. As a result, the 9/11 triggered war—what David Kilcullen links to al-Qaeda and explanatory models related to wars of globalization, globalized insurgency, Islamic civil war, and asymmetric warfare²—is far from over, with IS likely representative of a next generation insurgent organizational upgrade.

Still, the U.S. Army and other services have found themselves somewhat in a “strategic pause,” albeit one partially induced by deployment fatigue, large personnel and program reductions, and a scaled-down pivot to Asia directed at an authoritarian China. It is during this pause—with new threats making themselves known, such as the Russian seizure of parts of Ukraine via its proxies and non-uniformed military and the ongoing narco conflict in Mexico and other Latin American states—that reflection is warranted as it relates to the early-21st century global security environment. This is an environment that appears to

be seeing a rise in fragile and failed states, along with concurrent increased levels of criminality, extremism, terrorism, and barbarism taking place, and one that is ultimately linked to what can be theorized as new forms of insurgency that have been and are now emerging.

While the study of insurgency extends well over 100 years and has its origins in the guerrilla and small wars of the 19th century and beyond,³ almost no cross-modal analysis—that is, dedicated insurgency form typology identification—has been conducted. Until the end of the Cold War, the study of insurgency focused primarily on separatist and Marxist derived forms with an emphasis on counterinsurgency practice aimed at those forms rather than on identifying what differences and interrelationships existed. The reason for this is that the decades-long Cold War struggle subsumed many diverse national struggles and tensions into a larger paradigm of conflict—a free, democratic, and capitalist West versus a totalitarian, communist, and centrally planned East.

With the end of the Cold War and the resulting ideological and economic implosion of the Soviet Union, post-Cold War insurgency typologies began to emerge because a need existed to understand where this component of the new global security environment was heading. Over 2 decades of research and writing have been focused on this endeavor by what is a relatively small number of insurgency practitioners and/or theorists. In addition, the works of some contemporary terrorism scholars are also relevant to this topical area of focus.

For this monograph to identify what can be considered new forms of insurgency that are developing, an appreciation for and understanding of earlier

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DEFINING INSURGENCY

Before attempting to analyze the terrorism and insurgency literature as it relates to insurgency form identification, a short discussion of what an insurgency is and concepts related to it will be provided. The basic U.S. definition of an insurgency per the May 2014 Field Manual (FM) 3-24 *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies* is as follows:

. . . the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region. Insurgency can also refer to the group itself (JP [Joint Publication] 3-24).⁴

Of importance is the stipulation that both elements of subversion and violence are required to characterize an insurgency. Subversion on its own—derived from co-option and corruption—can be viewed as an element of big city political machines and parasitical

organized crime (along with minimal levels of criminal violence). The use of violence on its own, especially that which is conventional military in nature, is more indicative of warfare waged by states.

This present definition, however, is insufficient in that “political control” is a generic term and is devoid of strategic meaning. One of the earlier FM 3-24 drafts included the following wording — “. . . system of government or existing social order” being overthrown, changed or undermined.⁵ This has more utility for our definitional purposes because it can help to illustrate that a Westphalian state — or what is left of it in a failed state context — is the strategic prize being targeted by an insurgent force. Such a Westphalian state — with full sovereign rights — primarily exists within physical (human) space and can be characterized by the components of: a) ideology; b) government; c) economy; d) military; e) populace; and, f) religion (in a secularized context) and the ensuing relationships that exist between them.⁶ Each of these components are defined by the *Oxford Dictionaries* as follows:⁷

Ideology: A system of ideas and ideals, especially one which forms the basis of economic or political theory and policy.

Government: The group of people with the authority to govern a country or state.

Economy: The state of a country or region in terms of the production and consumption of goods and services and the supply of money.

Military: The armed forces of a country.

Populace: The people living in a particular country or area.

Religion: The belief in and worship of a superhuman controlling power, especially a personal God or gods.

The relationships of these components create hybrid governmental/social order combinations. For example, the relationship between ideology and economy can be said to result in the prevailing “political economy” that exists. Military and populace relationships, on the other hand, result in determining “soldier types” (conscript, professional, etc.) while ideology and military relationships help to define “civil-military relations.” These relationships represent state and societal bonds that are vulnerable to insurgent, and also terrorist, attacks derived from concepts of disruptive targeting.⁸

A modernist view of insurgency, one subscribed to by the U.S. Army, is grounded in Clausewitzian thinking and accepts that the Westphalian state represents the dominant form of “social and political organization” in existence. The modernist view further holds that the “liberal democratic state” with a strong middle class, upward social mobility, a separation of church and state, the enfranchisement of women, and the personal liberties enshrined in the Bill of Rights and Constitution is the most preferable and legitimate form of Westphalian state. Steven Metz has called this “the orthodox conceptualization,” derived from Western history and its tradition of enlightened politics that have seen the state shift from a parasitical form (for the benefit of aristocrats and the elite) to one based on a social contract and the consent of the governed.⁹

The populations of these Westphalian states are viewed from an inherent Western bias and said to be swayable via the provision of goods and services since they operate under a market logic of value optimization. Politics are thus consistent within a rational choice model. Derived from this orientation, the solution to the threat of insurgency is the development

of state and societal institutions so that they resemble Western liberal democratic states and cultures.¹⁰ Criticisms of this logic range from an adherence to a naive ethnocentrism to a slightly more ominous worldview reflective of Kipling's old 1899 poem, "The White Man's Burden,"¹¹ though with 19th century colonization now replaced by 21st century replication of the Western body politic. Regardless of the perspective, modern Army counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine is solidly Western state centric in orientation and has both benefited and suffered as a result. Detrimental examples include the contemporary downplaying of spirituality and religion as a fundamental motivator of non-Western tribal based societies and the earlier body count metrics utilized during the Vietnam era. On the positive side, insurgent forces typically have little hope of generating (much less sustaining) conventional land power capabilities in the face of overwhelming U.S. air superiority.¹²

TERRORISM AS INSURGENCY I&W

Some mention should also be made of terrorism vis-à-vis insurgency since terrorism may lead to insurgency and also since an insurgency may utilize terrorism as one of its tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). The U.S. Army definition of terrorism is derived from the Joint definition and is as follows:

The unlawful use of violence or threat of violence to instill fear and coerce governments or societies. Terrorism is often motivated by religious, political, or other ideological beliefs and committed in the pursuit of goals that are usually political.¹³

While a continuum and at times an overlap between terrorism and insurgency exists, the literature has a tendency to create an impermeable firebreak between them. This is due to theorist and practitioner specialization, commonly referred to as the “tyranny of the stove pipe,” that is illustrative of our hierarchical government institutions.¹⁴ Furthermore, terrorism scholars will not typically consider terrorist acts subordinate in importance to insurgent campaigns. They would argue, and many Western citizens would likely agree, that the 9/11 attacks in New York, Washington, and Pennsylvania, and the 7/7 attack in London are of greater significance than a change of government in a small African state or other remote locale. From this perspective, the terrorist potentials of al-Qaeda, rather than its potential for seizing control of states, would represent the greater magnitude threat to be focused upon in their investigations.¹⁵ The adherence to such a position by terrorism scholars can be maddening for insurgency scholars, since the logical conclusion of evolved terrorist groups is to achieve insurgent end states, but is understandable. If we move beyond this artificial separation of these fields of study and their inherent biases, it can be seen that incidents and patterns of terrorism may serve to provide I&W about forms of insurgency that have, are, and will be developing.

An example of this potential I&W function can be seen in David Rapoport’s four waves of international terrorism published in 2001.¹⁶ These waves are each projected to last for about 40 to 45 years, may have overlaps with one another, and are said to be based on some sort of precipitating event.¹⁷ The first wave is that of *anarchism* and spans the period from the 1880s to the 1920s. The goal of such terrorists was to bring about the destruction of government and liberate

individuals from the shackles of artificial human convention. “Propaganda of the deed” by means of assassination, via the bomb (dynamite) and the gun, were dominant along with the use of bank robbery for fundraising purposes. Groups engaging in this form of terrorism included the *Narodnaya Volya* (The People’s Will), Hunchaks, Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization, Young Bosnia, and the Serbian Black Hand.¹⁸

The second wave is *anti-colonial* or nationalistic in character. This type of terrorism spanned the 1920s to the 1960s. The goal was to establish nationalistic governments in place of European colonial administrations that exploited the local inhabitants. The basic tactics were to eliminate the police first and then engage in hit and run raids on troops to create counter-atrocities to increase social support for the terrorists. Groups engaging in this form of terrorism included the Irgun, the IRA, and EOKA.

The third wave is represented by the *new-left*. It began in the late-1960s and mostly dissipated by the 1990s which made it much shorter than the normal wave patterns dictated. Radicalism was combined with nationalism by many of these revolutionary groups seeing themselves as being the vanguard of the masses. Airline hijackings, kidnappings, and hostage-takings dominated this wave of terrorism. Groups engaging in this form of terrorism included the American Weather Underground, West German RAF, Italian Red Brigades, Japanese Red Army, the PLO, and the French Action Directe.

The fourth wave is based on *religious extremism*. This wave started in 1979 and is expected to continue out to about 2020 to 2025. The goal of this type of terrorism is to create religious—predominately Islamic—states and relies heavily upon suicide bombing techniques.

Extremist Islamist groups engaging in this form of terrorism include Hezbollah, Hamas, and al-Qaeda, but other terrorists including Aum Shinrikyo, Christian Identity, and Sikh and Jewish radicals are also active.¹⁹

A later fifth wave of terrorism emerging in the 1990s, derived from *utopian vision* (devolving into a cultist nightmare of horrors), was suggested as an addition to this typology by the religious scholar Jeffrey Kaplan in 2007. While the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia represents a precursor group for this proposed wave, the Lord's Resistance Army that arose in Northern Uganda represents a full-fledged example. Other terrorist groups that could also possibly exist in this wave are the *Janjaweed* fighters of Darfur, factions of the *Interahamwe* in parts of Central Africa, and components of the Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone. Dominant characteristics of this wave include rituals of rape and killing, pervasive violence, cultist and apocalyptic religious behavior, child abduction and the fielding of children soldiers.²⁰ See Table 5 in the Appendix for a listing of these five waves of terrorism.

It is likely that a lag time may exist between the beginning of a terrorist wave and the start of what can be considered an insurgency form.²¹ Following this logic, the emergence of a nationalistic terrorist group in a European colony would predate that of a nationalistic insurgent group. Thus, in some instances, terrorists could be considered proto-insurgents, initially only able to influence governmental policies and actions, but not as yet able to bring about greater and more significant change to a de facto system of governance or existing social order. This line of reasoning fits with a recent example of terrorism scholarship that seeks to link terrorism and insurgency patterns and activities. Daniel Byman, in 2008, wrote about proto-insurgen-

cies and how self-styled “armies” composed of weak terrorist and guerrilla groups found in southern Thailand, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and other locales used terrorism to create insurgencies where none had previously existed.²²

As a terrorist group evolves, and gains organizational sophistication, its ability to change and influence the political and social environment in which it resides will increase. This capacity for increasing social/environmental modification, as evidenced by the rise of *narcocultura* in Mexico, also extends to other non-state actors, such as drug gangs and cartels that utilize terrorism along with co-option as the basis of their tactics. Of course, an insurgent group can also devolve back into a terrorist group as it loses its organizational capacity to bring about significant governance or social order change.

A great deal of commonality between Rapoport’s (and Kaplan’s) “terrorism waves” and various “insurgency forms” likely exist—both the terrorist and insurgency scholars are seeing the same phenomena taking place—but of course neither discipline is normally paying much attention to the literature of the other. This can probably be said of transnational organized crime scholars that are seeing some convergence with patterns of terrorism and insurgency in an increasingly globalized world.²³ The lesson learned for insurgency theorists and practitioners is that the terrorism studies literature may have some very real indications and warnings value that can and should be capitalized upon when constructing insurgency forms.

REVIEW OF INSURGENCY TYPOLOGIES

This historical review of post-Cold War insurgency typologies will begin with the seminal 1993 work by Steven Metz titled, *The Future of Insurgency*. In about a half-dozen or so pages within that work Metz lays out the conceptual basis of both *commercial* and *spiritual* insurgency projections. These insurgency forms are highlighted below via direct quotes from Metz's paper.²⁴ Commercial insurgency is described as follows:

When the discontented define personal meaning by material possessions rather than psychic fulfillment, they create the environment for commercial insurgency.

Commercial insurgency is a quasi-political distortion of materialism.

The quickest and easiest path to material possessions and the satisfaction they appear to bring is crime. And, since the discontented of the Third World feel little attachment to the dominant system of values in their societies anyway, moral restraints on criminal activity are limited.

In this psychological context, commercial insurgency is essentially widespread and sustained criminal activity with a proto-political dimension that challenges the security of the state. In the modern word, its most common manifestation is narco-insurgency, although it may also be based on other forms of crime, especially smuggling. The defining feature is expansion of the criminal activity into a security threat, especially in the hinterlands where government control is limited.²⁵

The core regions in which this form of insurgency may arise are Latin America with its endemic organized crime related to narcotics trafficking and smuggling and the Golden Triangle area of Myanmar, Thailand, and Laos based on narcotics production. Moving on to spiritual insurgency, a description of it is as follows:

Spiritual insurgency is the evolutionary descendent of traditional revolution.

What will distinguish many post-Cold War spiritual insurgencies is an explicit linkage to the search for meaning. Anomie . . . the desire for a more broad-based sense of fulfillment rather than the simpler needs-based motives of past popular uprisings will drive insurgents.

At least two psychological factors undergird the relationship of insurgency and the search for meaning. One is the linkage between violence and liberation observed by Fanon. Participation in political violence is a spiritually liberating event by someone who feels abused, repressed, or alienated by a socio-political system. . . . The second factor deals with tolerance of psychological stimuli. . . . Stimulation becomes like an addictive drug where ever larger amounts are needed to satisfy the individual. Violence can provide such satisfaction. . . .

The essence of spiritual insurgency is rejection of a regime and, more broadly, of the social, economic, and political system associated with that regime.

One of the crucial interfaces for spiritual insurgency is between political violence and religion. Development was long associated with secularization, but throughout the world, the strains of modernization spawned a religious renaissance. Sometimes this takes militant or violent forms. . . . Because the notion of justice implies

punishment, it can be used to validate violence. And all the world's great religions deal with justice in some form. This can be distorted by revolutionary and terrorist leaders, whether Muslim, Christian, or any other religion, to justify their actions.

For insurgent leaders, the struggle is actually about power. They want it but do not have it. For their followers, however, the struggle is about personal meaning, the amelioration of discontent, and the punishment of injustice.²⁶

One of the specific regions where this form of insurgency may take hold is said to be the Middle East with its Shia and Sunni Islamist groups. The notion of using jihad, derived from its holy war rather than internal struggle articulation, as an important component of this insurgency form was also noted in this work.

Along with these two new insurgency forms, Metz also describes pre-existing insurgency subforms. These are: *people's war*, which is rural and protracted, built upon the teachings of Mao; *Cuban-style focquismo*, based on the thinking of Ernesto "Che" Guevara and the Cuban revolutionary experience; and, *urban insurrection*, derived from Russian, Nicaraguan, or Iranian perspectives.²⁷ According to Metz, all represent broader revolutionary insurgency form variegation, with that dominant form providing the basis from which the spiritual insurgency form is emerging. On the other hand the commercial insurgency form represents a twisted and deviant component of Western popular and material culture.

Metz, in the 1995 work, "A Flame Kept Burning," further touched upon the commercial insurgency form with the assertion that "... commercial insurgen-

cies probably will not attempt to rule the state but will seek instead a compliant regime that allows them to pursue criminal activity unimpeded.”²⁸ Additionally, he mentions that in 1979 the Iranians were involved in a reactionary insurgency which, in that instance, was one where a religious-based group seized power from a secular, modernizing government. Larry Cable’s *defensive* insurgency type, articulated in 1993, is also mentioned by Metz as essentially a state subgroup seeking “autonomy or outright independence.”²⁹ *Subversive* (or *camouflaged*) insurgency, identified by U.S. Army doctrine, is also discussed. This insurgency type appears more TTP than an actual form typology and “. . . will combine a legitimate, above-ground element participating in the political process and an underground using political or criminal violence to weaken or delegitimize the government.”³⁰

In 1998, Christopher Clapham, an African studies scholar, proposed four broad forms of insurgency based upon the African experience. These are *liberation*, *separatist*, *reform*, and *warlord* insurgencies.³¹ A useful overview of these insurgency groupings is provided by Jakkie Cilliers:

The first, *liberation* insurgencies, set out to achieve independence from colonial or minority rule, would include the independence wars by anti-colonial nationalist groups in the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Guinea-Bissau, and Mozambique. A second group, *separatist* insurgencies, seeks to represent the aspirations and identities of particular ethnic groups or regions within an existing state, either by seceding from that state altogether, or else by pressing for some special autonomous status. Virtually all African insurgencies, including the Angolan war, draw to some degree on ethnic differentiation within the state concerned. Nearby Zimbabwe is possibly the best example of

two competing 'nationalist' groupings, each reflecting a specific ethnic base amongst the Shona and Ndebele respectively, although with no overtly separatist agenda. The third group, *reform* insurgencies, seek radical reform of the national government, evident in the cases of the National Resistance Army in Uganda and the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front. The fourth, a new and controversial typology, is that of *warlord* insurgencies, which seem directed more towards a change in leadership and control of the resources available to the state than a change in policy, ideology or indeed in patterns of patronage. In some instances, such as in Liberia, warlords have gained state control. In neighbouring Sierra Leone, the Revolutionary United Front appears largely content to maintain a personal territorial fiefdom separate from existing state structure and boundaries.³²

In 2000, Jakkie Cilliers went on to add a fifth grouping to Clapham's typology which is termed *resource-based* insurgency. This type of insurgency is derived from four factors that have emerged. These are, according to Cilliers:

... the increased importance of the informal polity and economy in Africa, often in response to inappropriate economic policies, donor prescriptions, authoritarian and illegitimate governments or exploitative elites but also reflecting the lack of institutionalisation of the state itself.

The importance of the informal economy and of informal politics is, of course, facilitated by the continued weakening and even collapse of a number of African states about which much has been written.

... the effect of the end of the Cold War itself that has forced sub-state actors to develop alternative resources from those prevalent during the bipolar era.

. . . increased internationalisation and the apparent universal salience of economic liberalisation, sometimes referred to as globalisation, has opened up new avenues for linkages by local actors that can now bypass state control through networks that are neither geographically located nor internationally regulated.³³

In 1999, terrorism scholar Stephen Sloan developed the *apolitical* insurgencies construct derived from "... the apparent breakdown of the nation-state as the primary unit of action in the idealized international community." This form of insurgency is viewed as a component of the "privatization of public violence" being engaged in by narco-terrorists, transnational terrorists, organized crime, and multinational corporations that seek to control gray-area environments in order to maximize profits.³⁴ Additionally, in 1999, William G. Thom came up with a somewhat similar concept termed *economic* insurgency which also mimics Steven Metz's commercial insurgency articulation. In this instance, it was modeled on the Congo-Zaire Civil War of 1996-97 in that:

The rise of economic insurgency is in actuality related to the growth of large-scale, well armed and organized, banditry. Where soldiers are not paid, or otherwise suitably compensated, armed insurgents will emerge and gravitate toward the control of economic activity, whether it be stealing by the barrel of the gun, or a more sophisticated sale of concessions in territory controlled by the faction.³⁵

Ian Beckett, in the 2001 work, *Modern Insurgencies and Counter-insurgencies*, proposes a loose typology with pre-insurgency eras (historical and resistance/partisan) followed by Maoist based revolutionary warfare, formative experiences, wars of national

liberation (de-colonial), urban insurgency, superpower (Cold War) based insurgency, and an undefined “mish mash” of post-Cold War insurgency examples coupled with the typology thinking of some leading insurgency theorists.³⁶ Of Beckett’s loose typology, only *revolutionary warfare*, *wars of national liberation*, *urban*, and *superpower based* forms of insurgency can be considered sufficiently defined and developed for our consideration. The *revolutionary war* form is based on classical Maoist peasant based guerilla warfare of the 1930s and 1940s and its subsequent use in Vietnam and other locales. The *wars of national liberation* are said to be from the 1950s through the 1980s and take place in European colonies with an emphasis on Malaya, Kenya (Mau Mau), and the rest of Sub-Sahara Africa.³⁷

The *urban* insurgency form dates from the late-1960s (Marighela’s *Minimanual*) where a blurring with modern politically inspired terrorists existed well into the 1970s. Groups highlighted were the precursor FLN (National Liberation Front) in Algeria that operated in the 1950s and 1960s and the later ERP (People’s Revolutionary Army) in Argentina, *Tupamaros* in Peru, RAF (Red Army Faction) in West Germany, and the SLA (Symbionese Liberation Army) in California. The *superpower based* form accounts for the proxy nature of many of the national liberation and urban insurgencies that took place primarily backed by the Soviet Union. Notable exceptions of U.S. involvement took place in El Salvador with the Contras and in Afghanistan with the Mujahideen.³⁸ Overlaps between these insurgency forms, especially with the first three being evolutionary variants of people’s war over the course of 50 years from rural to urban and within the context of local media to global media, should be noted.

As a follow-on work to his earlier book, Ian Beckett, in 2005, published a paper titled, “The Future of Insurgency.” In it, he touched upon the shift from rural to urban insurgency and a combination of the two in the 1980s and 1990s. He then continued his 2001 book discussion of insurgency theorists and went on to highlight the typology thinking of a few more of them.³⁹ Concerning the future of insurgency, “net war,” theorized by Arquilla and Ronfeldt, is mentioned along with the blurring of distinction between insurgents and terrorists and international criminals – though no new emergent insurgency forms are offered.⁴⁰

In 2004, David Kilcullen published a 72-page *Small Wars Journal* essay laying out his initial views on the emergence of a *globalized Islamist* insurgency, one primarily being carried out by al-Qaeda, its allies, and affiliates. He discusses this insurgency form in the first two sections of this work, focusing on the fact that it is a worldwide Islamist jihad movement and should be treated as insurgency, not terrorism, and in subsequent sections categorizes it as a systems model of insurgency that can be disaggregated.⁴¹ Later essays and books, such as *The Accidental Guerrilla* (2009) and *Counterinsurgency* (2010) built upon this initial work. While this practitioner-theorist has separatist insurgency experience with a post-Cold War Indonesian focus, his post 9/11 interests initially were primarily radical Sunni Islamist based and centered on countering this global insurgency form. Because of this specific counterinsurgency emphasis, his initial contribution to the literature, while significant, is that of identifying one insurgency form and supporting the U.S. Government in combating it rather than creating a more encompassing typology.

In 2005, Bard O'Neill's book, *Insurgency & Terrorism*, however, did just that by detailing a typology of nine insurgency types. These forms have made an impact on the literature, being often commented on, and are identified as: *anarchist*, *egalitarian*, *traditionalist*, *apocalyptic-utopian*, *pluralist*, *secessionist*, *reformist*, *preservationist*, and *commercial* (based on the Metz typology). The first five forms are all said to be "revolutionary" in nature. The *anarchist* form is contemporary in nature and includes the Black Cells and Black Hand (Germany) from the 1970s and the 17 November (Greece) organization that is still active. None of the anarchist movements are said to be of much significance. The *egalitarian* form is essentially Marxist in nature with the Huks in the Philippines and the Vietcong in South Vietnam mentioned as archetypical examples. This form has greatly ceased to exist, with a few remnant groups such as the Shining Path in Peru, the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) in Colombia, and the Front for the Liberation of Nepal. The *traditionalist* form is split into two subforms—the first seeking to restore a recent (or distant past) political system and the second to restore a political system from the ancient past. Examples of the first subform are the Nationalists in Spain (1936-1939), the Contras in the 1980s, and Shia tribesmen in Yemen in the 1960s. The second subform, termed *reactionary-traditionalist*, is composed of Islamic groups such as Hezbollah and al-Qaeda along with extremist Jewish and Christian militants.⁴²

The *apocalyptic-utopian* form is derived from religious cults with political aims and includes *Aum Shin-rikyo* in Japan and the *Mahdaviyat* (Last Imam) group in Iran. The last of O'Neill's revolutionary groups is the *pluralist* form, seeking the establishment of pluralist (liberal) democracies. Examples given include the

African National Congress (Spear of the Nation) from the 1970s and 1980s in South Africa and the current NCRI (National Council of Resistance of Iran). The *secessionist* form seeks to withdraw from a political community (the state) and either establish a brand new one or merge with another pre-existing one. This form can also be characterized as wars of national liberation. Numerous examples are provided for this dominant insurgent form and include the Confederate States of America (1861-1865), the National Liberation Front in Algeria, the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, the Kosovo Liberation Army in Albania, and the various IRA (Irish Republican Army) factions in Northern Ireland.⁴³

We can then turn our attention to the *reformist* form. This form seeks to “. . . target policies that determine distribution of the economic, psychological, and political benefits that society has to offer.”⁴⁴ Single issue policy groups such as abortion, animal, and environmental rights activists clearly fit this typology. Other examples of this insurgency form include the Zapatistas in Mexico seeking Indian rights, militant Kurds seeking their ethnic rights, and the neo-Nazi White Wolves who seek to re-establish white dominance via exclusionary mandates in the United Kingdom. In turn, the *preservationist* form is reactionary in nature and is simply status quo seeking. Such “dead hand of the past” groups include the KKK (Ku Klux Klan) in the United States, the Afrikaner Resistance Movement in South Africa, and the Ulster Volunteer Force and Ulster Defense Association in Northern Ireland. The final insurgency form, derived from Metz’s *commercialist* form, has already been covered in an earlier discussion in this section.⁴⁵

In addition to the titles and topics previously discussed, Metz, after a multi-year hiatus related to

such conceptualizing, wrote a few later works that specifically discuss insurgency forms. In 2004, in a work with Raymond Millen, Metz focused on *national* and *liberation* insurgencies. In the first type, a regime and insurgents are at odds. Concerning the two sides, "... distinctions between the insurgents and the regime are based on economic class, ideology, identity (ethnicity, race, religion), or some other political factor."⁴⁶ In the second type of insurgency, "These pit insurgents against a ruling group that is seen as outside occupiers (even though they might not actually be) by virtue of race, ethnicity, or culture. The goal of the insurgents is to 'liberate' their nation from alien occupation."⁴⁷ The second type of insurgency is reminiscent of Clapham's *liberation* form described in 1998, but includes both Communist and Islamic based groups, making it more expansive. Furthermore, the *national* insurgency form is a very broad "catch all" articulation that could be applied to multiple forms and therefore not useful to this monograph. Gray areas and permeability between these two forms are also said to exist. Metz, in a 2007 manuscript, went on to re-evaluate various aspects of contemporary insurgency. Of importance is his short description of "virtual" insurgents/insurgencies that is based on information sourced to T.X. Hammes in a U.S. Army TRADOC (Training and Doctrine Command) and U.S. Joint Forces Command presentation in January of that year. This is actually the second mention of this proposed insurgency form.⁴⁸ The form also appears in the writings of Timothy Thomas in both a Summer 2006 *IO Sphere* article and within a chapter in the 2007 edited book, *Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century*.⁴⁹ In the 2006 work, Thomas's initial usage was as follows:

It is important for planners to begin conceiving a virtual insurgency environment, because it can influence an operation to the same degree as a radio transmission, by summoning troops to the front. Working on countercyber capabilities now allows US IO planners to understand how to neutralize future insurgent cyber capabilities.⁵⁰

In the 2007 work, Thomas builds upon the previous quote yet comes to the conclusion that, while the virtual realm itself exists, virtual insurgencies do not presently exist—"The conclusion drawn from this discussion is that virtual elements are the agitators and propagandists of today's insurgency much like pamphlets, journals, and leaflets were at the time of the French Revolution."⁵¹ David Betz, in 2008, also discusses this potential form—although only as a dimension of traditional insurgency. He provides two main observations:

The first is that the arrival of social media and near real-time digital imagery means that the connection between the popular perception of the war and the physical battlefield is much more immediate and therefore volatile.

The second is that the 'virtual dimension' with which this paper is concerned is essentially a new form of 'propaganda of the deed' in which deeds, violent and otherwise, act as symbolic and rhetorical tools for combatants akin to 'political marketing' aimed at the formation of sympathetic support-communities.⁵²

His usage of the term "propaganda of the deed" gives it more of a terrorism form component—related to late-19th century anarchism—rather than as an attri-

bute indicative of physical based insurgency. This terrorism theme is picked up by Stephen Sloan in 2011 in what is a very important, yet overlooked, theoretical work and expanded into transdimensional space. He notes the growing importance of cyberspace in relationship to traditional humanspace and how the virtual dimension is becoming a battleground in its own right—not just as a method of terrorist communication—in which insurgency can be fought:

The importance of cyberspace, as noted earlier, will lead to a new form of conflict, not the traditional territorially based insurgency — ‘the war in the shadows’ but a war of abstraction, of images, and the vital role of perception. We are witnessing the emergence of virtual terrorism and virtual insurgency.⁵³

Sloan’s dual-dimensional thinking had its origins in an earlier red team and counterterrorism project on which he had worked with this author. Within Sloan’s report, cyberspace—linked to 5th dimensional battlespace perceptions—becomes a domain that can be fought over just as physical space can be.⁵⁴

In a 2012 *Parameters* essay, Metz looked at the internet and new media and its relationship to the evolution of insurgency. Of significance is his typology of differing insurgencies derived from the end states that they hope to achieve. These are known as *proto-state*, *nonpolitical*, and *state destruction* insurgency forms. The first form is derived from Maoist people’s war as the archetype in which a proto-state is created on the path to the takeover of the pre-existing government. The second form seeks impunity of action by an organized group—specifically narcos or other types of criminals—which attempt to hollow out the state. This form is synonymous with Metz’s *commercial*

insurgency form first articulated over 2 decades ago. Examples of such groups are the FARC in Colombia, the Shining Path in Peru, and various African movements. The final form, state destruction, is most intriguing. It draws upon network and swarming behaviors and the intentional creation of chaos within a society. It:

. . . consists of insurgencies that hope to replace the state, but because they are unable to control significant territory, approach the goal of destroying the state and replacing it in a sequential rather than a simultaneous manner. Their initial focus is destruction.⁵⁵

This form has typology limitations, because it does not easily correlate with the other insurgent forms identified in this literature review. One reason is a lack of examples provided and the fact that any weak insurgent movement could utilize this approach.

A variant of Metz's *commercial* insurgency form was then conceptualized in 2008 by John Sullivan as *criminal* insurgency.⁵⁶ This articulation has now become the dominant one characterizing Mexican cartel insurgent activities, due to the numerous publications—including many books—focusing on this subject matter, vis-à-vis more traditional organized crime perceptions.⁵⁷ Such insurgencies are derived from criminal enterprises competing with the state not for political participation but to free themselves from state regulation and control in the illicit economic sphere. As these organized criminal groups create environmental conditions conducive to total “impunity” of action—via waging campaigns of violence and subversion (by means of corruption) against the public, state institutions, and competing organized crime groups—contested and lawless zones result. As Sullivan and Rosales have stated:

The cartels may not seek a social or political agenda, but once they control turf and territory and effectively displace the state they have no choice—they become ‘accidental insurgents.’⁵⁸

In addition to the cartels gaining de facto political control of local cities whose police forces, courts, and governmental decisionmaking structures have been co-opted, additional detrimental outcomes take place. These include socio-cultural shifts via the rise of *narcocultura* that, in essence, promote deviant values and ways of living, the resocialization of the young to embrace cartel over state loyalties, and even in some instances an acceptance of criminal and dark forms of spirituality. Additionally, given the predatory capitalist nature of the global illicit economy, cartel “para-state” areas have witnessed an expansion of criminality via extortion and street taxation, kidnapping, bulk and resource theft, and associated activities.

The topic of spiritual insurgency was then resurrected by Matthew Lauder in a 2009 piece for the Canadian defense establishment. He credited Metz with initially conceptualizing this insurgency form, but then argued that this construct needed to be greatly expanded by being more religiously grounded. This form variant can be viewed as *violent new religious movements* based:

It is, therefore, my intent to augment Metz’s conceptualisation of spiritual insurgency, and show that spiritual insurgencies are not secular-political constructs with a (superficial) religious dimension, but rather violent new religious movements, guided by a religious worldview and political-theology, that seek totalising social transformation (in particular, the annihilation

of perceived religious adversaries) through the use of divinely-sanctioned violence.⁵⁹

Lauder then went on to develop nine themes, which are common to *spiritual* insurgencies being conducted by violent new religious movements:

- 1) That participants believe they have exclusive access to the sacred and sacred knowledge (gnosis);
- 2) That participants see the outside world as both illegitimate and corrupt;
- 3) That the world is dualistic in nature, divided into the sacred and the profane, good and evil;
- 4) That salvation can only be achieved through the elimination of evil and corrupting influences, and that violence is necessary to (symbolically) cleanse the world;
- 5) That violence is divinely-willed and sanctioned (i.e., God deems the use of violence, manifested as a holy war, as necessary);
- 6) That the new social order (i.e., re-structured society) is modelled on the sacred, usually in the form of an idealised and mythical past;
- 7) That movements are informed and maintained by a central prophetic character;
- 8) That participants see themselves as agents of the sacred and soldiers of God; and,
- 9) That the end state is the implementation of divine-law (i.e., a politically theology), which guides all thinking and behaviour.⁶⁰

Examples of these new movements include *Aum Shinrikyo*, the Branch Davidians, the Christian Identity Movement, and of course, al-Qaeda.⁶¹

In 2011, Charlie Tarr elaborated on the concept of *resource control* insurgencies related to the case of the Niger Delta with its great oil deposits. The work highlights indigenous elite based petro-capitalism and how local insurgent groups engage in “resource war” as it relates to the larger “new war” paradigm proposed by Mary Kaldor back in 1998.⁶² This blurring of the crime and war environments is indicative of the context in which Metz’s much earlier *commercial* insurgency construct, as later modified by John Sullivan’s *criminal* insurgency sub-typology, operates. In 2011, Robert C. Jones writing on insurgencies, as they relate to Special Operations Command perceptions, proposed three insurgency types with overlapping combinations depending on the groups involved and local conditions on the ground:

Insurgency is a natural response to critical perceptions within distinct and significant segments of the populace and typically manifests in some combination of three broad categories of action: *revolution*, *separatism*, and *resistance*. Most populaces perceive their governance to be tolerably good, resulting in generally stable conditions; however, as such perceptions degrade within distinct and significant segments of the populace, the conditions of insurgency grow. When this occurs it places ever increasing demands on the government to either undergo *evolution* to address these concerns or increase their security capacity to suppress the resultant illegal popular *revolution*. In broadest terms there grows a fundamental desire for *liberty*⁴ within a populace where perceptions of poor governance produce conditions of insurgency. This is true if the populace’s goals are *revolutionary*, to change

some part or whole of the existing government (such as the Afghan Taliban leadership in Pakistan or the recent uprisings in North Africa); *separatist*, to break some distinct region from the whole to form a new state (such as the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, or Kurds in Northern Iraq); or a *resistance*, to challenge some foreign occupation (such as the rank and file Taliban in Afghanistan).⁶³

This categorization scheme is both interesting and problematic from a typology form perspective because of the fuzzy nature of the combinations – as can be seen with the differing Taliban leadership and rank and file motivations above – and as a basic functional form is devoid of religious or economic (greed) type motivators which gives it a somewhat secular and sanitized feel.⁶⁴

Robert Bunker, in 2011, then developed the *pluto-cratic* insurgency form as a variation of Metz's *commercial* insurgency articulation and a post-modern counterpart to Sullivan's concept of *criminal* insurgency. It is also related to John Robb's view on the hollowing out of the state (2008), the *Deviant Globalization* (2011) work of Nils Gilman *et al.*, and the extensive literature on the growing disparity of income between the 1% (to the .001%) and the rest of the Western social classes.⁶⁵ Theoretically, this represented a missing component of epochal change model elements focusing on state deinstitutionalization during the transition to the post-modern era. This insurgency form may be contentious due to the fact that "... it involves global elites and lacks the traditional trappings of an insurgency (i.e., an armed struggle)."⁶⁶ As an insider threat to the Westphalian state system, however, it leverages "the coercive force of the state" via the use of lawyers, lobbyists, and campaign donations to create

national laws and policies favorable to its global capitalism needs. This places it an odds with state moderated forms of capitalism, older middle class based socio-economic patterns, and allows for the suppression of protests and dissent of the governed by means of captured domestic policing and court structures. In a 2015 essay on this insurgency form, Bunker identified such predatory capitalist activities as follows:

- Stress profit and equity gain at all costs;
- Follow the principles of hyper-rationalism;
- Show no loyalty to workers, supplies, customers, or even nations;
- Increasingly operate within a sovereign free economy;
- Utilize corruption, co-option, and coercive force as required; and,
- Have a willingness to profit from the informal, and even illicit, economy.⁶⁷

In that essay, Bunker went on to highlight the growing power of multinational corporations and global elites, to better define plutocratic insurgency elements, and discussed the ongoing “public looting for private gain” of what is becoming a new class of supra-bourgeoisie transnational elites.

Digressing a couple of years to 2013, Seth Jones and Patrick Johnson published an essay on the future of insurgency. A component of this essay discussed how “China could become increasingly involved in supporting insurgencies and counterinsurgencies if its economic and military power continues to increase and its global interest expands.”⁶⁸ This is one of the first instances in which post-Maoist *Chinese state* linked insurgency form potentials have been raised in the

literature.⁶⁹ The authors see Chinese involvement with both insurgencies and counterinsurgencies plausible within the next decade. Factors that could determine this include the following:

- (1) A continuing rise in its economic and military power;
- (2) An increase in its global interests;
- (3) Limited power projection capabilities; and,
- (4) Progress on its capabilities to support insurgencies and counterinsurgencies.⁷⁰

Of course, added to these factors would be a forceful response to a more direct U.S. containment strategy in the South-China Sea being imposed against it. Taking a different trajectory, in 2013 Michael Rectenwald published “The Singularity and Socialism” that takes us down corridors of *singularity* insurgency potentials. The work is devoid of the typical science fiction angst and looks at cyborg and artificial intelligence potentials linked to neo-Marxist thinking that, in a sense, produces a new form of angst. The singularity or “. . . the hypothetical, near-future point at which machine intelligence will presumably supersede human intelligence, and when an intelligence explosion will commence” will include the use of gene therapy and computer prostheses implanted in human brains (e.g., wetware).⁷¹ Of concern to that author are the aims of a “technocratic, ruling elite” utilizing such advanced technologies for global human domination purposes. Interestingly, such perceptions find some common ground with the rogue globalized capitalism concerns of Bunker—echoed by Gilman—as they relate to the *plutocratic* insurgency form.

Nils Gilman, in fact, in a 2015 foreword to a work focusing on both the *criminal* and *plutocratic* insurgency forms, went on to highlight their interaction within “The Twin Insurgency” construct tied to epochal change and deviant globalization strategic perceptions. The piece discusses the failures of social modernism, the revolts of mainstream globalization’s winners (the plutocrats) and deviant globalization’s winners (the criminals) compressing the modern state form between them, and the enclavization of micro-sovereignties and the end of the middle class.⁷²

A newer work by David Kilcullen, *Out of the Mountains*, published in 2013, also needs to be singled out for its theoretical impact. In this instance, Kilcullen provides a second insurgency form contribution in addition to his earlier *globalized Islamist* (2004) one. This one is focused on *urban* insurgency – one could even say *neo-urban* insurgency – which views the urban environment as a system (e.g., a living thing) which exists in a certain symbiosis with insurgents, but can be killed by means of botched counterinsurgent operations. Such megacity environments are vastly growing in importance due to the megatrends of population growth, urbanization, littoralization, and connectedness taking place and are likely to be the battlegrounds of future conflict. Within these systems, informal networks are as, or even more, vital than the state due to the establishment of a normative system. This system yields predictable order for an indigenous population and is established by non-state entities by means of the process of competitive control.⁷³

This conceptualization, while unique, builds upon many works and appears to have been partially inspired by a *Small Wars Journal* essay by John Sullivan and Adam Elkus. That essay, dating from 2009,

focused on urban siege—highlighting the Mumbai incident—as it relates to Richard Norton’s “feral city” construct battling the military colony (e.g., military urbanism) for dominance. Their approach to urban insurgency is very post-modernistic—rather than *urban left* focused—and can be considered very much a part of the new urban school thinking championed by Kilcullen a few years later.⁷⁴

Finally, the book, *Wars from Within*, published in 2015 and edited by Albrecht Schnabel and Rohan Gunaratna, provides a typology of three insurgency forms. It is a revised and updated version of a limited run 2006 book published in Singapore and is heavily influenced by terrorism scholarship.⁷⁵ As a result, it is somewhat outside of the more traditional insurgency literature, as was Rapoport’s work that was highlighted earlier in this monograph for its I&W utility. The insurgency forms classified in the work are *ethnic*, *religious*, and *ideological* and are discussed in sequential chapters by various contributing authors. *Ethnic* insurgency is viewed as one of the major forms of armed conflict in the world and has the goal of either seeking more autonomy or independence of a specific ethnic homeland. Ethnonationalist groups highlighted include the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and the more commonly known Irish IRA and the Basque *Euskadi Ta Askatasuna* (ETA). The *religious* insurgency form is seen as a violent reaction to the threatened world order of a specific religion and considered defensive in nature. While historical examples of both Jewish and Christian groups are provided, this is predominantly a modern radical Islamist manifestation, though contemporary Sikh and white racial purity extremist examples are included. A more extreme subset of this insurgency form is messianic in nature. It is viewed as

lacking legitimacy and, in a sense, composed of zealots drawing upon religious orthodoxy. The *ideological* construct is based on revolutionary Marxist-Leninist thought through Trotskyism and Maoism and into the later 1960s and 1970s leftist terrorism. Groups identified as engaging in this form of insurgency include the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the Colombian National Liberation Army (ELN), the Shining Path in Peru, and the Red Army Faction (RAF).⁷⁶

PROPOSED INSURGENCY TYPOLOGY

Derived from combining the five terrorism waves typology of Rapoport (and Kaplan) given its I&W utility and the more encompassing review of the preceding body of insurgency literature focusing on typologies conceptualized by various theorists (Metz, Clapham, Beckett, and O'Neill), a proposed typology of old and new insurgency forms has been developed. This proposed typology is divided into legacy, contemporary, and emergent and potential forms. An overview of each insurgency form will be described by means of a short paragraph description supported by tables with form onset dates, group examples, and the theorist and form (year of identification) that corresponds with them. The utility of creating this proposed typology schema is that it will allow for policy and response recommendations to be made in subsequent sections of this monograph as they relate to the strategic implications of these identified insurgency forms and U.S. defense policy.

LEGACY INSURGENCY FORMS

Four legacy insurgency forms have been identified (See Table 1). For the most part, they relate to historical forms of insurgency that took place prior to and/or during the Cold War. Still, the *separatist* form is not totally defunct and the *urban left* form, while presently defunct, has the potential to emerge once again. These legacy forms are as follows:

Insurgency Form (Onset)	Group Examples	Theorists: Form (Year)
Anarchist (1880s)	Narodnaya Volya Hunchaks Young Bosnia Serbian Black Hand Black Cells Black Hand (Germany) 17 November (Greece) Black Bloc	Rapoport; <i>Anarchism</i> (2001) O'Neill; <i>Anarchist</i> (2005) Metz; <i>State Destruction</i> (2012)
Separatist—Internal and External (1920s)	Irish Republican Army (IRA) Irgun Mau Mau Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN) Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)	Cable; <i>Defensive</i> (1993) Clapham; <i>Liberation, Separatist, Reform</i> (1998) Beckett; <i>Wars of National Liberation</i> (2001) Rapoport; <i>Anti-Colonial</i> (2001) Metz and Millen; <i>Liberation</i> (2004)—with limitations O'Neill; <i>Secessionist</i> (2005) Schnabel & Gunaratna; <i>Ethnic</i> (2006; 2015) Jones; <i>Separatist, Resistance</i> (2011)
Maoist People's (1930s)	Chinese Communists Hukbalahap (Huks) Vietcong Shining Path Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) Colombian National Liberation Army (ELN)	Metz; <i>People's War</i> (1993) Beckett; <i>Revolutionary Warfare</i> (2001) O'Neill; <i>Egalitarian</i> (2005) Schnabel & Gunaratna; <i>Ideological</i> (2006; 2015) Metz; <i>Proto-State</i> (2012)

Table 1. Legacy Insurgency Forms.

Insurgency Form (Onset)	Group Examples	Theorists: Form (Year)
Urban Left (Late-1960s)	National Liberation Front (FLN) (Precursor) Weather Underground Red Army Faction (RAF) Red Brigades Japanese Red Army Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) Bolivarian Alliance (Potentials)	Metz; <i>Urban Insurrection</i> (1993)— devoid of the Iranian experience Beckett; <i>Urban</i> (2001) Beckett; <i>Superpower Based</i> (2001)— Soviet proxy component Rapoport; <i>New-Left</i> (2001) Schnabel & Gunaratna; <i>Ideological</i> (2006; 2015)

Table 1. Legacy Insurgency Forms. (cont.)

Anarchist (1880s). Generally violent, anarchism has only been viewed as a form of terrorism (Rapoport, 2001), because the end state sought is governmental—even state—destruction. No replacement government or seizure of the state is being attempted nor is any form of subversion or co-option of state institutions or the parallel building of a shadow state taking place. Still, O’Neill (2005) designates this as an insurgency form and the insurgency outcome of state destruction exists in a later typology created by Metz (2012).⁷⁷ Major historical anarchist terrorist events include the assassinations of national leaders such as Tsar Alexander II (1881) and President McKinley (1901), and the Haymarket Riot (1886), Barcelona Opera House (1893), and Wall Street (1920) bombings. These incidents took place roughly over a 3 decade period and then dramatically subsided. Present anarchist activities pale in comparison and are typically event driven with protests at political conventions and financial summits, which are quite common.⁷⁸ Recent domestic examples are the 1999 World Trade Organization (WTO) riots in Seattle and at the 2000 Democratic National Convention (DNC) in Los Angeles in which Black Bloc anarchists engaged in street actions. Anarchist protests in Europe—especially in Greece—used rocks, Molotov

cocktails, and even green laser pointers against police forces during violent street riots, and are ongoing in the wake of Greek economic instability.

Separatist – Internal and External (1920s). This insurgency form encompasses both separation from local authority – such as the original IRA gaining Irish independence from the United Kingdom in 1921 – and the separation from foreign authority as took place in numerous regions during the decolonial period after the Second World War. Numerous theorists have identified this insurgency form, ranging from Cable’s (1993) *defensive* articulation through a number of others into Jones’s (2011) *separatist* and *resistance* types. Examples of this form of insurgency have taken place with the Irgun, a Zionist organization, operating in Palestine during the 1930s and 1940s, the Mau Mau active in Kenya in the 1950s, the Basque ETA off and on again since the late-1960s, and the Zapatistas in Chiapas, Mexico in the 1990s. A component of this form of insurgency is typically that of an ethnic grouping seeking to gain independence from the perceived domination of a larger, or at least dominant, ethnic grouping. While seemingly on the wane, this insurgency form has not become defunct. With the end of the decolonial period, this form of insurgency has shifted to incidents of separation from local authority within both European states and former colonial ones, with the conflicts in former Yugoslavia and Sudan representing recent examples.

Maoist People’s (1930s). The most identifiable insurgency form is derived from Mao Zedong’s principles found in his 1937 work, *On Guerrilla Warfare*. This form, also known as “people’s war,” utilizes peasant armies that are drawn upon for an integrated and protracted politico-military phase strategy of even-

tual state takeover. A shadow or proto-state is created in parallel to the pre-existing one being targeted for elimination. This form has been identified by Metz (1993) as *people's war*, by Beckett (2001) as *revolutionary warfare*, by O'Neill (2005) as *egalitarian*, and Schnabel and Gunaratna (2006; 2015) as *ideological*. This approach was utilized by the Chinese communists in the 1930s and 1940s and by the Vietcong primarily in the 1960s. The Tet Offensive of January 1968 in South Vietnam drew upon these tenets and represented a large-scale systemic terrorist (e.g., disruptive) attack on the government of the Republic of South Vietnam, the United States, and their allied forces. It ultimately destroyed the will of the American public, which subsequently and irrevocably turned against the U.S. war effort. While this form of insurgency is now defunct, it has morphed into the following form—just as the rural guerrilla evolved over time into the urban guerrilla and later into the modern day terrorist.

Urban Left (Late-1960s). This insurgency form has been identified by a number of theorists and, as mentioned above, is a continuation of earlier Marxist politico-military concepts with a more urbanized emphasis. Peasants no longer fight in the countryside or surround cities—their successors now engage in terrorist tactical actions within them. Metz's (1993) *urban insurrection*—devoid the Iranian experience, Beckett's (2001) *urban* and *superpower based* Soviet proxy component, Rapoport's (2001) *new-left*, and Schnabel and Gunaratna's (2006; 2015) *ideological* (which spans the earlier Marxist form and this one) all address this form. Groups involved in this type of insurgency include the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) founded in 1964, the Weather Underground in the United States—which, in 1969, developed out of an

element of the Students for a Democratic Society, — the Red Army Faction (also known as the Baader-Meinhof Gang) founded in Germany in 1970, the Red Brigades founded in 1970 in Italy, and the Japanese Red Army founded in 1971. This insurgency form is essentially defunct. Even the PLO (and the Fatah faction), which has quasi-statehood on the West Bank, has moved beyond it and now has to contend with its own insurgency threat emanating from Hamas out of Gaza, which itself is representative of the *radical Islamist* form. Concerns over the resurrection of this insurgency form have existed for a decade now, however, and have been focused on Chavez's *bolivarianismo* and envisioned "Super Insurgency" aimed at changing the status quo in Latin America.⁷⁹ These concerns have more recently been raised by Douglas Farah as they relate to the eight member Bolivarian Alliance supported by external powers such as China, Russia, and others.⁸⁰

A number of forms were identified in the literature review that can be considered "widowed" and outside of the legacy typology. Metz's *Cuban-style focquismo* (1993) form can be said to exist between the *Maoist people's* and *urban left* forms listed above. Metz and Millens's *national* (2004) form covers multiple insurgency forms that have been identified and is too broad of a categorization scheme to be utilized. Finally, O'Neill's *reformist* and *preservationist* (2005) forms are only terrorism focused. The initial one is indicative of single issue policy groups and present racist organizations (e.g., abortion and animal activists and neo-Nazis). The latter form is status quo seeking and specifically concerns ethnic and hate groups (e.g., the KKK and the Ulster defense groups).

CONTEMPORARY INSURGENCY FORMS

Four contemporary insurgency forms have been identified (See Table 2). Two of these insurgency forms represent politico-military threats (*radical Islamist* and *criminal*), one form is beneficial to the promotion of U.S. strategic interests (*liberal democratic*), and the final one represents the conflict between state moderated capitalism and predatory global capitalism now taking place (*plutocratic*). They are as follows:

Insurgency Form (Onset)	Group Examples	Theorists: Form (Year)
Radical Islamist (1979)	Iranian Revolutionaries Hezbollah Shia Militias (Iraq) Mujahideen Taliban al-Qaeda Islamic State	Metz; <i>Reactionary</i> (1995) Rapoport; <i>Religious Extremism</i> (2001) Kilcullen; <i>Globalized Islamist</i> (2004)— Sunni focus O'Neill; <i>Reactionary-Traditionalist</i> (2005) Schnabel & Gunartna; <i>Religious</i> (2006; 2015)
Liberal Democratic (1989)	Contras (Precursor) African National Congress (ANC) Free Syrian Army (FSA) National Council of Resistance Iran (NCRI)	Beckett; <i>Superpower Based</i> (2001)— United States proxy component O'Neill; <i>Pluralist</i> (2005)
Criminal (Early-2000s)	African Warlords Colombian and Mexican Cartels Latin American Gangs Ndrangheta (Italy)	Metz; <i>Commercial</i> (1993) Clapham; <i>Warlord</i> (1998) Sloan; <i>Apolitical</i> (1999) Thom; <i>Economic</i> (1999) Cilliers; <i>Resource-Based</i> (2000) O'Neill; <i>Commercial</i> (2005) Sullivan; <i>Criminal</i> (2008) Tarr; <i>Resource Control</i> (2011) Metz; <i>Non-Political</i> (2012)
Plutocratic (2008)	Global Elites (.001% to 1%) Multinational Corporations	Metz; <i>Commercial</i> (1993) Bunker; <i>Plutocratic</i> (2011)

Table 2. Contemporary Insurgency Forms.

Radical Islamist (1979). The Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 and the ensuing 444-day U.S. Embassy hostage crisis ushered in a new insurgency form derived from the perception that mosque and state are inexorably intertwined. The *radical Islamist* form has two variants—one Shia and the other Sunni based—and stems from the fact that Islam never underwent a historical reformation that ushered in secular political thought and a separation of the spheres of church (or mosque) and state. The Shia form was exported to Southern Lebanon with the creation of Hezbollah in the early-1980s from a cadre of Iranian Revolutionary Guards sent to organize local resistance in reaction to the 1982 Israeli occupation.⁸¹ Since that time, Hezbollah has gone on to create a para-state in Southern Lebanon and link up with the Shia diaspora in Western Africa and Latin America for illicit revenue generation and associated terrorist activities. Additionally, elements of the Revolutionary Guards (and the al Quds intelligence branch) and Hezbollah are presently operating in Iraq and Syria in coordination with their Shia and Alawite allies, respectively. The Sunni component of this insurgency form has transitioned through generations beginning with the Mujahideen battling the Soviets in Afghanistan from 1979-1989, the establishment of al-Qaeda in the late-1980s and their initial Western directed attacks and network expansion, the rise of the Taliban in the mid-1990s, the 9/11 attacks and massive U.S. boots on the ground and hunter-killer drone response, and the eventual contraction of al-Qaeda and rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria and its ongoing network expansion as its likely successor. Scholars recognizing this insurgency form are Metz (1995) *reactionary*, Rapoport (2001) *religious extremism*, Kilcullen (2004) *globalized Islamist*, O'Neill

(2005) *reactionary-traditionalist*, and Schnabel and Gunaratna (2006; 2015) *religious*.

Steven Metz has provided a dissenting view on this insurgency form, suggesting that the term “radical” is a Western construct that reflects a bias toward what it considers “moderate” — i.e., essentially friendly to U.S. groups. As a result, this insurgency form includes a strange mixture of entities including the Islamic State, the Taliban, various al-Qaeda franchises, and Hezbollah. He sees a typology form better aligned along the continuums of sectarian (e.g., Sunni and Shia) and traditional versus modernizing/reformist groups.⁸² The author’s intent concerning this form is to capture the “religious component” of that type of insurgency—one the United States too often overlooks given its Western secularized (e.g., post-Reformation) bias. Further, it provides some of the conceptual linkage to the *blood cultist* form that will be addressed later. Still, the author would agree with Metz that this is a macro-form articulation and presently more theoretical than practical in terms of the policy insights that it may yield.

Liberal Democratic (1989). The removal of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, the ensuing end to Communist rule in Eastern Europe thereafter, and the eventual dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991 marked not only the end of the Cold War, but also the power of pluralist uprisings as the Polish Solidarity shipyard workers have shown. That liberal democracy could provide the basis for an insurgency form has been noted by both Beckett (2001), as the American component of the Cold War *superpower based* conflict, and also later by O’Neill (2005), more specifically within his *pluralist* form designation. The rise to power of the African National Congress (ANC) in South

Africa in the early-1990s — which required it to engage in a fair amount of violence and subversion in the process — and the *Partido Acción Nacional* (PAN) victories in the 2000 and 2006 Mexican presidential elections — which worked within the political system — are both examples of pluralist political victories. Where this form has become muddled is when democracy has been “externally forced” on the population of a state by means of military defeat rather than “internally acceded to” by means of an actual or threatened insurgency. The conceptual origins of the military defeat variant can be drawn back to the post-World War II era in which the populations of the major belligerents — Japan and Germany (at least the Western portion) — were socially re-engineered into liberal democracies by the United States. Decades later this provided a faulty conceptual blueprint for the assumed post-conflict phases that would occur after the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. In those phases, it was assumed that the United States would once again have the luxury of birthing new democracies. Nothing could be further from the truth, however, with the *radical Islamist* form ever since repeatedly breaking out across wide swaths of Afghanistan and Iraq. Further, the advance of liberal democracy has been stalled in most of the 2010 Arab Spring states either in the face of intransigent autocratic governments or in the wake of post-authoritarian state control environments that have resulted in al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, and related jihadist groups violently contesting the establishment of any form of pluralist governance.

Criminal (Early-2000s). Elements and components of this insurgency form have been projected and identified by numerous scholars: Metz’s (1993) *commercial*, Clapham’s (1998) *warlord*, Sloan’s (1999) *apolitical*,

Thom's (1999) *economic*, Cilliers's (2000) *resource-based*, Tarr's (2011) *resource control*, and Metz's later (2012) *non-political*. Of these various articulations, Sullivan's (2008) *criminal* designation—directly derived from Metz's 1993 perceptions—has become the dominant one as it relates to the insurgent-like activities of the gangs and cartels in Mexico and Latin America. These groups include the third generation *Mara Salvatrucha* (MS-13) and Eighteenth Street (Barrio 18, M-18) gangs found in Central America as well as the various Mexican cartels, such as the Sinaloa Federation, *Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación* (CJNG), and Tijuana cartels.

While Mexican army troops were not deployed until December 2006 by the Felipe Calderón administration to fight the cartels in substantial numbers, by the early-2000s it was clear this insurgency form had emerged—with the fielding of professionalized cartel paramilitary units and the rampant corruption of local police forces throughout regions of that sovereign state. The essence of this insurgency form is that it is illicit economic rather than politically or religiously driven. The activities of African warlords and the *Ndrangheta* (organized criminals) in Italy also provide further examples of this form. Illicit organizations seeking impunity of action and freedom from governmental control ultimately become victims of their own success, and as a result, find themselves in positions of de facto political authority via their use of violence and corruption to achieve their ends. The accumulation of economic and the coercive power by criminal means ultimately translates into political power. It is in some ways representative of early state-making in Europe, when the families of local strongmen over time acquired titles and legitimacy as they filled the political and institutional voids that had been created

coming out of the Medieval era. For this reason, this insurgency form is ultimately indicative of transformation of war and epochal change perceptions.

Plutocratic (2008). Of all of the insurgency forms offered in this monograph, this may be one of the most contentious. It specifically views the rise of globalized capital devoid of any ties to the state—in essence, representative of an emerging form of 21st century postmodern capitalism—in direct conflict with earlier forms of 20th century state moderated capitalism promoted by liberal democratic governments. It views the rise of stateless multinational corporations, and the global elites (.001% to 1%) they serve as the major stakeholders, as insider insurgent threats to the international order. This insurgent form serves as a corollary to the preceding *criminal* form and represents another variant to Metz's (1993) *commercial* articulation postulated by Bunker (2011). In this case, however, rather than being promoted by criminal outsiders and have nots, this form is being promoted by the winners of globalization to maximize their profits even more. It utilizes subversion and corruption by means of lawyers and lobbyists aimed at democratically elected officials and coercive force based on co-opted elements of the state to shut down protests backed up by private security forces serving as private enclave protective details. It may ultimately result in making the social contract between the citizen and the state as meaningless as it has become between the citizen and their private employer. Business risk and future costs are increasingly being placed on the employee who is being stripped of medical and retirement benefits and are being utilized increasingly in contract and part-time positions. Trending toward this form began with the Reagan-Thatcher revolution in the 1980s, but had

not become clear until 2008 with the global nature of the *plutocratic* insurgency – as seen with the ensuing stock market crashes and bank bailouts – unmasking it.⁸³ An outcome of this insurgency form is the compression of the American middle class and an increasing bifurcation of the haves and have nots within American society. Gilman’s “Twin Insurgency” construct later served to illustrate the interaction of this insurgency form and the *criminal* one to the detriment of Westphalian sovereignty and Western democratic peoples.

The only insurgency form of significance not incorporated into the contemporary typology forms is Metz’s *state-destruction* (2012) form that is utilized by weak insurgents unable to seize territory. It would appear mostly associated with the *criminal* insurgency form, but could also be conceivably utilized within the *radical Islamist* and even the *plutocratic* forms under specific conditions. In the case of the latter, these conditions would be to, a) gain resource and market concessions from, or b) combat foreign industry nationalization by, an intransigent regime.

Additionally, current Russian operations in Ukraine have an insurgent component within them and must be considered. Still, this component is subordinated within the larger umbrella of Russian hybrid warfare. The sending of Russian troops into the Ukraine without their uniforms – the “little green men” that Putin calls local self-defense groups – is one component of hybrid warfare. Another component is paying indigenous organized crime groups to engage in assassinations and street terrorism. Still another is arming local ethnic Russian insurgents.⁸⁴ The list goes on with Russian cyberwarfare campaigns, European natural gas embargos, proposed money bailouts

to Greece, and even the shaping of Western public opinion via RT network, originally Russia Today, news broadcasts. Hybrid warfare draws upon all attributes of coercive power—utilizing force, economics, and communication—to promote authoritarian Russia state international agendas. For this reason, Russian insurgent activity in the Ukraine is beyond the scope of the insurgency forms identified in this monograph.⁸⁵

EMERGENT AND POTENTIAL INSURGENCY FORMS

Two emergent and three potential insurgency forms have been identified (See Table 3). The first form, *blood cultist*, is increasingly becoming a concern and is derived from cult-like behaviors. It is emerging to some extent in both contemporary radical Islamist and criminal insurgency environments. The second form, *neo-urban*, is emerging and tied to the breakdown of state control over some of the megacities of the world. The third form, *virtual*, has near to midterm potential to develop and exists primarily in cyberspace. The fourth, *Chinese authoritarianism*, also has near to midterm potentials concerning its development, depending on where future U.S.-China relations may go. The final form, *cyborg and spiritual machine*, is set far in the future and is science fiction-like in its potential for development—though it must still be considered for the dangers it would represent to democratic freedoms and pure strain (unenhanced) humans themselves.⁸⁶ These forms are as follows:

Insurgency Form (Onset)	Group Examples	Theorists: Form (Year)
Blood Cultist (Emergent)	Khmer Rouge (Precursor) Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) Los Zetas/Cartel del Golfo (Santa Muerte) La Familia Los Caballeros Templarios al-Qaeda in Iraq (al-Zarqawi cell) Islamic State Components	Metz; <i>Spiritual</i> (1993) & Sullivan; <i>Criminal</i> (2008) Combination O'Neill; <i>Apocalyptic-Utopian</i> (2005) Schnabel & Gunaratna; <i>Religious—Messianic</i> subset (2006; 2015) Kaplan; <i>Utopian Vision</i> (2007) Lauder; <i>Spiritual—as Violent New Religious Movements</i> (2009)
Neo-urban (Emergent)	Inner City Gangs Local Militias Organized Crime Private Security Groups	Metz; <i>Commercial</i> (1993) & Metz; <i>Urban Insurrection</i> (1993) Combination Sullivan & Elkus; <i>Urban</i> (2009) Kilcullen; <i>Urban</i> (2013)
Virtual (Potential; Near to Midterm)	Hacktivists Online Vigilantes Second Life Terrorists Anonymous, GhostSec al-Qaeda and Islamic State adherents	Thomas; <i>Virtual</i> (2006) Hammes; <i>Virtual</i> (2007) Sloan; <i>Virtual</i> (2011) Metz; <i>State Destruction</i> (2012)
Chinese Authoritarianism (Potential; Near to Midterm)	People's Republic of China (PRC)	Jones and Johnson; <i>Chinese State</i> (2013)
Cyborg and Spiritual Machine (Potential; Long Term/ Science Fiction)	Augmented/Enhanced Humans (Wetware & Bio-implants) Strong AI (Artificial Intelligence)	Metz; <i>Spiritual</i> (1993) & Bunker; <i>Plutocratic</i> (2011) Combination Rectenwald; <i>Singularity</i> (2013)

Table 3. Emergent and Potential Insurgency Forms.

Blood Cultist (Emergent). Insurgency forms derived from any type of spiritual or religious underpinnings are normally difficult for U.S. military thinkers and operators to readily accept. Rather, the standard view that secular motivators derived from power, money, and criminality is dominant.⁸⁷ Religion is viewed as nothing more than a facade and a justification to achieve such secular pursuits. This insurgency form goes beyond religious motivations and takes us down the path of cultish behaviors, utopian worlds, apocalyptic yearnings, and even instances of human sacrifice to one or more gods for appeasement or dark-magic

religious petition purposes. The existence of this type of insurgency form has been recognized by a number of scholars (O'Neill, 2005; Kaplan, 2007; and Lauder, 2009) primarily within the last decade and ultimately represents a fusion of criminality, spirituality, and barbarism. It is most recognizable with recent Islamic State activity involving mass ritual beheadings, crucifixions, child rape, and related atrocities and their “end of days” type of pursuits.⁸⁸ Even the name of the online IS magazine, *Dabiq*, refers to a prophesized location in Syria where one of the apocalyptic battles will be fought. Insurgent groups actively promoting the coming of the Mahdi prior to the Day of Judgment in the Shia tradition of Islam also fall into this typology. Attributes of this insurgency form can also be found with *La Familia Michoacana* (LFM) and *Los Caballeros Templarios* (The Knight’s Templars) cartels in Mexico that engage in Christian cultish behaviors and elements of *Los Zetas* and *Cartel del Golfo* that are involved in extreme forms of Santa Muerte worship which seek supernatural protection, death magic spells, and power and riches. Since this insurgency form is so extreme in nature, the number of active foot soldiers it can be said to represent is still quite limited. However, youth indoctrination programs, such as the IS “Cubs of the Caliphate” and recruitment of child soldiers by *Los Zetas* (e.g., Baby-Zetas) suggest that a ready supply of new *blood cultist* insurgents are actively being brainwashed.⁸⁹

Neo-urban (Emergent). This emergent insurgency form is not a resurgence of the old *urban left* form dating back to the late-1960s derived from small numbers of politicized leftist-leaning urban guerrillas. Rather, this form is post-modernistic in orientation with concerns over feral cities and sprawling slums—such as

in Karachi, Rio, Lagos, and Nairobi—controlled by inner city gangs, local militias, organized crime and private security groups. It is far more like Mike Davis, *Planet of Slums* (2006), than Ridley Scott, *Blade Runner* (1982), and relatively devoid of higher technology influences. Theoretically, it can be considered a kludge of Metz's *commercial* (1993) and *urban insurrection* (1993) forms updated by means of Sullivan and Elkus's *urban* (2009) and Kilcullen's *urban* (2013) focused insurgencies writings. Kilcullen's competitive control focus is further indicative of fractured sovereignty and state deconstruction. It is thus conceptually allied with the neo-Medievalism works of Hedley Bull (1977), Jorg Friedrichs (2001), and Phil Williams (2008).⁹⁰ This insurgency form has become the focus of present "megacities issue" studies by U.S. Army insurgency experts and is highlighted by such works as the Army Chief of Staff's Strategic Studies Group/Concept Team's *Megacities and the United States Army* (2014) and William Adamson's "Megacities and the US Army" published in *Parameters* (2015).⁹¹

Virtual (Potential; Near to Midterm). This potential insurgency form is seeing operations being conducted by hacktivists, online vigilantes, "Second Life" (virtual game) terrorists, and "Anonymous" and "GhostSec" members as well as al-Qaeda and Islamic State adherents and affinity members. Initial thinking on this potential form solely focused on its being an adjunct to physical based insurgency. It was simply viewed as a means of virtual communications—a more efficient type of "propaganda of the deed" or cyber *levée en masse* (form of mobilization)—which was initially discussed by Thomas (2006 & 2007), Hammes (2007 in Metz), and Betz (2008) with some of these initial components also touched upon earlier by Mackinley (2005) and Cronin (2006).⁹² Additionally, Steven Metz

sees the vigilante component of *virtual* insurgency as a means to potentially punish the state for “perceived misbehavior” — which conceptually can be linked to his *state destruction* form identified in 2012 with links back to patterns of anarchist behavior found with Rapoport (2001) and O’Neill (2005).⁹³ The initial “adjunct to physical insurgency” viewpoint has been challenged by new perceptions articulated by Sloan (2011). Sloan sees the virtual realm as its own reality in which insurgency can now be waged — a view shared by this author given his past collaborative work with Sloan. As a result, this potential insurgency form is reflective of a changing 21st century battlefield composed of dual-dimensional space-time attributes, derived from humanspace and cyberspace, with its increasing virtual overlay placed over our physical reality. Further, this insurgency form may also be considered a possible precursor to the potential *cyborg and spiritual machine* form discussed later. Initial *virtual* insurgencies would be waged by humans, and increasingly by expert and weak artificial intelligence systems, with later and more mature cyberspace based insurgencies waged by cyborgs and spiritual (strong artificial intelligence) based machines.

Chinese Authoritarianism (Potentials; Near to Mid-term). China’s industrialization and rise to power is reminiscent of the United States in the 1890s when its military and political influence emerged as an outcome of its own industrial buildup and modernization. With the closing of the American frontier, the predatory war against Spanish colonial possessions, and the later circumnavigation of the globe by the Great White Fleet, the United States was poised to take its place with the world’s great powers. China is now not only in the process of industrializing, but has been running

a massive mercantilist-like trade surplus, and investing in countries across the world in order to gain access to raw materials and resources. In addition to China's Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and "Belt and Road" initiatives in Asia and within the former lands traversed by the old Silk Road, it has made significant political and economic investment inroads into both Africa and Latin America.⁹⁴ In retrospect, Chinese activity in Africa has been compared to old school British colonialism. Enclaves of Chinese nationals have been established along with economic activities that extend beyond the formal economy into informal and illicit activities for predatory capitalist purposes.⁹⁵ The insurgency potentials of Jones and Johnson (2013) can thus been seen vis-à-vis the U.S. "Pivot to Asia" and the ensuing engagement and containment strategy being directed at China.⁹⁶ Any number of issues related to Taiwanese independence, local Hong Kong rights to self-governance, or South-China Sea claims and man-made fortified island-reef construction could conceivably trigger direct military tensions between China and the United States, because the United States would be required to fulfill its treaty obligations in support of its allies. Blowback from such tensions could readily result in the Chinese promotion and support of local insurgencies in any number of regions as a counter-move to what they could construe as "hostile" U.S. actions in support of a more encompassing containment strategy.⁹⁷ An opposing view on such Chinese insurgency potential has been voiced by Steven Metz. He opines that China is now itself vulnerable to insurgency—possibly even *people's war*—since it has become ideologically bankrupt from a revolutionary perspective. Additionally, he does not see basic anti-Americanism as a replace-

ment ideology that China can utilize to solidify ties to insurgent groups. For this reason, he is presently skeptical that Chinese would potentially attempt to promote some form of insurgency against the United States in the future.⁹⁸

Cyborg and Spiritual Machine (Potentials; Long Term/ Science Fiction-like). This insurgency form can be considered a “blue sky” scenario but must still be considered for its potentially dire implications. Further, debates over the ethics of use and the actual banning of “killer robots” utilizing varying levels of artificial intelligence are presently taking place along with expressed concerns over the future enhancement of humans with bio-implants and wetware.⁹⁹ This insurgency form is derived from the merging of the *spiritual* (Metz, 1993) and *plutocratic* (Bunker, 2011) forms and has also been raised in neo-Marxist *singularity* form thinking (Rectenwald, 2013). Such concerns have been the lore of science fiction for decades and can be found in Isaac Asimov’s “Three Laws of Robotics” meant to protect humanity from such threats through the dystopian *Terminator* series in which the self-aware Skynet computer system targets humanity for eradication.¹⁰⁰ Such an insurgency form has the potential to develop out of the “haves” of the world being augmented with bio-implants and their human private security (e.g., mercenary) forces being upgraded with armed robots with AI capabilities. While genetic and trans-genetic human enhancement is not a required attribute of this insurgency form, it is expected that it would be an additional component of the augmentation of the “haves” of the world. Some debate exists whether such a future actually represents a threat to humanity or if these are natural outcomes of the informational and bio-technical revolutions taking place and that all

human beings at some point will be augmented and enhanced.¹⁰¹ From the perspective of contemporary pure strain humans living in a democratic society, however, such a future very much appears to represent a threat to our present liberties.

Metz, in recent correspondence with the author in 2015, raised the possibility that a *radical Christian* insurgency form could possibly develop. It could arise out of areas wherein tensions between Christians and Muslims are taking place, such as sub-Saharan Africa, or in Latin America with some sort of politicized Pentecostal ideology fighting the power nexus between the Catholic Church, the state, and the elite. Because this is more of a “possibility” observation rather than an articulated form formally published in a professional or policy venue, it has been included for research purposes, but will not be included in the final insurgency form listing.¹⁰²

STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. DEFENSE POLICY

Derived from the insurgency forms identified, the strategic implications of each form for U.S. defense policy are as follows (See Table 4).

Anarchist (1880s). Strategic implications: None. This legacy insurgency form is an anachronism with the threat potentials downgraded to that of sporadic periods of local unrest being generated by protesters outside of political conventions and financial summits and characterized by vandalism, aggravated assault, and arson. This is solely a U.S. domestic law enforcement issue focusing on riot control, investigation of criminal activities, and limited counterterrorism response. No U.S. military response is required.

Insurgency Form (Onset)	Status / Strategic Implications (DoD)	U.S. Response (Advocated)
Anarchist (1880s)	Legacy (<i>Downgraded to Sporadic Civil Unrest</i>) No Implications	Law Enforcement; -Riot Control -Counterterrorism (Limited)
Separatist—Internal and External (1920s)	Legacy (<i>Sporadic</i>) Limited Implications	Varying Governmental Agencies; -Situational Response
Maoist People's (1930s)	Legacy (<i>Defunct</i>) No Implications	-----
Urban Left (Late-1960s)	Legacy (<i>Defunct</i>) No Implications to Limited	Varying Governmental Agencies; -Situational Response
Radical Islamist (1979)	Contemporary Significant Implications <i>Grouping May Be Too Inclusive</i>	Federal Law Enforcement and/or Military Lead (All-of-Government)
Liberal Democratic (1989)	Contemporary Mixed (Beneficial) Implications	Varying Governmental Agencies -Indirect and Direct Facilitation Role
Criminal (Early-2000s)	Contemporary Limited to Moderate Implications	Law Enforcement and/or Military Lead (All-of-Government)
Plutocratic (2008)	Contemporary No Present Implications	Varying Governmental Agencies -Legal and Economic Focus -Federal Law Enforcement
Blood Cultist	Emergent Limited to Moderate Implications	Federal Law Enforcement and/or Military Lead (All-of-Government)
Neo-urban	Emergent Moderate to Significant Potentials	Law Enforcement and/or Military Lead (All-of-Government)
Virtual	Potential; <i>Near to Midterm</i> Initially Limited but Increasing Overtime	Federal Law Enforcement and/or Military Cyber Forces
Chinese Authoritarianism	Potential; <i>Near to Midterm</i> Significant Implication Potentials <i>Implementation Barriers Exist</i>	Intelligence Community; -Monitoring & Analysis State & DoD; -Behavioral and Environmental Shaping
Cyborg and Spiritual Machine	Potential; <i>Long Term/Science Fiction-like</i> No Present Implications	Defense Science Board; -Scientific Monitoring -Environmental Shaping

Table 4. Insurgency Forms, Status, Strategic Implications (DoD), and U.S. Response.

Separatist – Internal and External (1920s). Strategic implications: Limited. This insurgency form now takes place only sporadically and to some extent has been replaced by more traditional secession ballot

initiatives as have or may be seen in the future as taking place in Scotland, Catalonia, Flanders, and other locales. Still, the insurgencies of the 1990s that took place in the former Yugoslavia and the more recent secession of South Sudan in 2011 suggest this legacy form has not faded away. A possible U.S. military response may be required depending on the specific international incident taking place.

Maoist People's (1930s). Strategic Implications: None. This legacy insurgency form is defunct. No U.S. military response is required

Urban Left (Late-1960s). Strategic implications: None to limited. This legacy insurgency form appears to be defunct, therefore, no U.S. military response is required. However, the promotion by the Bolivarian alliance of such potentials exists and could be facilitated by Russian, Iranian, and Hezbollah, and/or Chinese support. Still, if this insurgency form should reappear, the impact is estimated to be limited. It would require varying U.S. Government agency involvement based on a situational response.

Radical Islamist (1979). Strategic implications: Significant. Since the Iranian Revolution in 1979, both Shia and Sunni forms of radical Islam have been promoting this insurgency form. Groups involved include Hezbollah, al-Qaeda, and the Islamic State. Of all the presently active insurgency forms, this one most significantly impacts U.S. defense policy as witnessed by years of recent deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq and ongoing operations in Syria, Yemen, and numerous other locales. This insurgency form requires either federal law enforcement or the military (typically) as the designated lead. An all-of-government approach is required to mitigate and defeat this insurgency form, which presently possesses a radical Sunni terrorism

component—utilizing both large scale and lone wolf attacks—representing a direct threat to the U.S. homeland. Concern exists over this grouping of Islamist entities being too inclusive.

Liberal Democratic (1989). Strategic implications: Mixed (beneficial). This insurgency form should be viewed as an opportunity to extend democratic values rather than as an actual or potential threat of some sort to the United States or its allies. Varying U.S. Government agencies may provide indirect and/or direct facilitation of such insurgencies. The one downside of this insurgency form is unintended second and third order effects—for example, U.S. support to the mostly defunct Free Syrian Army (FSA) inadvertently strengthened the Islamic State (IS) by helping to weaken the Assad regime.

Criminal (Early-2000s). Strategic implications: Limited to moderate. Typically, the groups involved in this insurgency form—Colombian and Mexican cartels, Central American gangs, and the Italian mafia—are viewed as a law enforcement concern. However, some of the African warlords and the more operationally capable cartel groups, such as *Los Zetas* and CJNG (*Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación*), have overmatch capability to any law enforcement response.¹⁰³ For the United States, the response to this insurgency form requires either federal law enforcement (typically) or the military as the designated lead. An all-of-government approach is required to mitigate and defeat this insurgency form that springs out of Mexico and is bringing corruption into U.S. border zones along with sporadic incidents of narco-terrorism.

Plutocratic (2008). Strategic implications: None presently. The U.S. military has no current role in the response to the rise of predatory global capitalism

and the emerging “sovereign free” entities engaging in it. Rather, varying governmental agencies with a legalistic and economic mandate will be required to promote state moderated capitalist values and laws. Federal law enforcement agencies will be tasked to support such efforts as they relate to financial crimes, tax avoidance, and related offenses.

Blood Cultist (Emergent). Strategic implications: Limited to moderate. This insurgency form can be viewed as a mutation of either radical Islam and/or rampant criminality, as found in parts of Latin America and Africa, into dark spirituality based on cult-like behaviors and activities involving rituals and even human sacrifice. To respond to this insurgency form, either federal law enforcement or the military will be the designated lead depending on the specific international incident taking place. An all-of-government approach will be required to mitigate and defeat this insurgency form, which has terrorism (and narco-terrorism) elements that represent direct threats—especially concerning the Islamic State—to the U.S. homeland.

Neo-urban (Emergent). Strategic implications: Moderate to significant potentials. At its more benign levels of criminality, this is a law enforcement concern, but at the point that public safety resources are overwhelmed and internal stability is threatened, it increasingly becomes a military concern. A major issue is governmental inability to effectively control sprawling slums and the possible role of gangs, militias, and organized crime as a stabilizing and norm inducing force. Of further concern is the fact that this insurgency form readily has the capacity to merge with the *criminal* insurgency form. An all-of-government approach is required for megacities which are

in advanced stages of this insurgency form because it ultimately signifies that urban competitive control has shifted to informal networks and non-state entities.

Virtual (Potential; Near to Midterm). Strategic implications: Initially limited but increasing over time. This potential insurgency form spans a basic criminal or terrorist act (e.g., recruiting and fundraising for the Islamic State) through increasing levels of sophistication, such as the release of classified governmental documents (e.g., WikiLeaks), the shutdown of components of a state's public and private infrastructure, and actual destructive cyberattacks. Ultimately, it may represent an entirely new component of insurgency taking place both in cyberspace and eventually as a component of dual-dimensional (e.g., humanspace and cyberspace) operations. An initial response to virtual support of terrorists and insurgents will need to come from federal law enforcement and specialized computer forensic and cyber task forces. More systemic and malicious type attacks, approaching what can be considered *virtual* insurgency levels, will result in military and intelligence agency cyber forces also being utilized for response purposes.

Chinese Authoritarianism (Potential; Near to Midterm). Strategic implications: Significant potentials. Given that China is rising as a great power and now has global economic and political interests and reach, this proposed insurgency form could in the near to midterm represent a threat to U.S. national security. However, significant barriers to implementation exist stemming from a lack of a transnational ideology that can solidify ties to insurgents. Ongoing monitoring and analysis by the intelligence community of such threat potentials is warranted for strategic early warning purposes. Additionally, behavioral and

environmental shaping by the Department of State and Department of Defense to promote desirable futures should be implemented.

Cyborg and Spiritual Machine (Potentials; Long Term/ Science Fiction-like). Strategic implications: None presently. This proposed insurgency form is viewed as having long-term threat potentials, although it is presently science fiction-like in nature. The appropriate U.S. response is Defense Science Board monitoring of technologies related to cybernetic implants and strong artificial intelligence and the shaping of policies and laws that promote democratic and constitutional values.

APPENDIX

FOCUS	PRIMARY STRATEGY	TARGET IDENTITY	PRECIPITANT	SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS
Anarchists 1880s-1920s	Elite assassinations and bank robberies	Primarily European states	Failure/slowness of political reform	Developed basic terrorism strategies and rationales
Nationalist 1920s-1960s	Guerilla attacks on police and military	European empires	Post-1919 delegitimization of empire	Increased international support (UN and diasporas)
New Left/Marxist 1960s-1990s	Hijackings, kidnappings, hostage taking	Governments in general; increasing focus on the United States	Vietcong successes	Increased international training/cooperation/sponsorship
Religious Extremism 1979-2020s	Suicide bombings	United States, Israel, and secular regimes with Muslim populations	Iranian revolution, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan	Casualty escalation, decline in number of terrorist groups
Utopian Vision 1990s-2030s	Rituals of rape and killing, child soldiers, use of narcotic drugs	Inward turning, charismatic leaders institute cult-based behaviors	Khmer Rouge in Cambodia prior to victory	Further radicalize and break away from established terrorist wave

Source: Modified from Karen Rasler and William R. Thompson, "Looking for Waves of Terrorism," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 28, No. 1, 2009, pp. 28-41, that modeled David C. Rapoport, "Modern Terror: The Four Waves," in Audrey K. Cronin and James M. Ludes, eds., *Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy*, Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2004, pp. 46-73; with the addition of Jeffrey Kaplan, "The Fifth Wave: The New Tribalism?" *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 19, Iss. 4, 2007, pp. 545-570.

**Table 5. Rapoport's (and Kaplan's)
Five Waves of Terrorism.**

ENDNOTES

This work benefited from past research conducted at the libraries of the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, and the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC), Fort Leavenworth, KS, and discussions held with personnel of the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA and the Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) and Counterinsurgency Center, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC), Fort Leavenworth, KS. All mistakes and omissions are solely those of the author of this monograph.

1. Matthew Rosenberg and Mark Mazzetti, "More U.S. Troops Seen Staying in Afghanistan," *International New York Times*, March 29, 2015, available from nytimes.com/2015/03/20/world/asia/more-us-troops-seen-staying-in-afghanistan.html?_r=0; and Eric Bradner, Barbara Starr, and Jim Acosta, "White House authorizes up to 450 additional troops in Iraq," CNN, June 10, 2015, available from cnn.com/2015/06/09/politics/u-s-considering-1000-additional-troops-in-iraq/.

2. This relates to Kilcullen's accidental guerrilla syndrome being promoted by al-Qaeda. See David Kilcullen, *The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One*, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 5-38.

3. See Major C.E. Callwell, *Small Wars: Their Principles & Practice*, 1899, 1903 Reprint, Seaside, OR: Watchmaker Publishing, Reprint 2010; and Max Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power*, New York: Basic Books, 2012. For related works, see Robert J. Bunker, "Unconventional Warfare Philosophers," *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, Vol. 10, No. 3, Winter 1999, pp. 137-150.

4. Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-33.5, *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies*, Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, May 2014, p. Glossary-3. The definition is derived from Joint Publication (JP) 3-24 *Counterinsurgency*, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, November 22, 2013, p. I-1.

5. FM 3-24, *Counterinsurgency*, Revision Issue Paper #1 – Definitions, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Center: Fort Leavenworth, KS, January 20, 2012, p. 4.

6. This is a modified Clausewitzian trinity represented by the people, government, and the army with additional components. Of note is that both things (the components) and the linkages between the things (their bonds and relationships) can be respectively targeted destructively and disruptively.

7. *Oxford Dictionaries*, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2012, available from oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/.

8. Robert J. Bunker, "Terrorism as Disruptive Targeting," *TRENDS Research & Advisory*, January 11, 2015, available from trendsinstitution.org/?p=870.

9. Steven Metz, "Rethinking Insurgency," in Paul B. Rich and Isabelle Duyvesteyn, eds., *The Routledge Handbook of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency*, London: Routledge, 2012, p. 33.

10. *Ibid.*, pp. 35-37.

11. Rudyard Kipling, "The White Man's Burden," *McClure's Magazine*, Vol. 12, Iss. 4, 1899, pp. 290-291, available from pitt.edu/~syd/twmb.html.

12. The Islamic State is increasingly being forced to devolve its land power capabilities to smaller and smaller units now that U.S. and coalition airpower—both unmanned and manned—are increasingly targeting it. In some ways, this is devolving it from a conventional army-like threat to more of a small unit based insurgent one. See Jennifer Griffin, "Iraq militants changing tactics, complicating US airstrike mission," *Fox News*, August 12, 2014, available from foxnews.com/politics/2014/08/12/iraq-militants-changing-tactics-complicating-us-airstrike-mission/.

13. Joint Publication (JP) 3-07.2, *Antiterrorism*, November 24, 2010, available from dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/.

14. See Robert J. Bunker, "The Mexican Cartel Debate: As Viewed Through Five Divergent Fields of Security Studies," *Small Wars Journal*, February 11, 2011, available from smallwarsjournal.com.

com/jrnl/art/the-mexican-cartel-debate. Another issue of concern is a sub-discipline of study potentially at odds with liberal democratic sovereignty. This can be seen in the field of terrorism studies with the relatively recent rise of "critical terrorism studies" and its state terrorism over non-state terrorism focus, although the scholars engaged in these studies see themselves as protecting liberal democratic freedoms. See Marie Breen Smyth *et al.*, "Critical Terrorism Studies—An Introduction," *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, Vol. 1, Iss. 1, April 2008, pp. 1-4.

15. It should be noted that some of the initial terrorism scholars, such as Stephen Sloan and Brian Jenkins who have been researching and writing on terrorism since the early-1970s, also have the capacity to engage in insurgency studies. Some of the next generation of terrorism scholars, including Bruce Hoffman, also have this unique ability. A classic paper on both subjects—along with their interrelationship to conventional warfare—is Brian Michael Jenkins, *New Modes of Conflict*, R-3009-DNA, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, June 1983, available from rand.org/pubs/reports/R3009.html.

16. David C. Rapoport, "The Fourth Wave: September 11 in the History of Terrorism," *Current History*, Vol. 100, Iss. 650, December 2001, pp. 419-424. See also David C. Rapoport, "The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11," *Anthropoetics*, Vol. 8, No. 1, Spring/Summer 2002, available from anthropoetics.ucla.edu/ap0801/terror.htm; and David C. Rapoport, "Modern Terror: The Four Waves," in Audrey K. Cronin and James M. Ludes, eds., *Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy*, Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2004, pp. 46-73.

17. Rapoport's typology has resulted in numerous supportive and critical scholarly works. See Mark Sedgwick, "Inspiration and the Origins of Global Waves of Terrorism," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol. 30, Iss. 2, 2007, pp. 97-112; Karen Rasler and William R. Thompson, "Looking for Waves of Terrorism," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 28, Iss. 1, 2009, pp. 28-41; Leonard Weinberg and William Eubank, "An End to the Fourth Wave of Terrorism?" *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol. 33, Iss. 7, 2010, pp. 594-602; and Jean E. Rosenfield, ed., *Terrorism, Identity and Legitimacy: The Four Waves Theory and Political Violence*, London: Routledge, 2011.

18. David C. Rapoport, "The Fourth Wave: September 11 in the History of Terrorism," *Current History*, Vol. 100, Iss. 650, December 2001, pp. 419-424. See also David C. Rapoport, "The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11," *Anthropoetics*, Vol. 8, No. 1, Spring/Summer 2002, available from anthropoetics.ucla.edu/ap0801/terror.htm; and David C. Rapoport, "Modern Terror: The Four Waves," in Audrey K. Cronin and James M. Ludes, eds., *Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy*, Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2004, pp. 46-73.

19. *Ibid.* Another newer terrorist typology based on five overlapping phases exists. It mostly shares the same characteristics as Rapoport's four waves with the addition of a phase existing from 1919 through the 1930s derived from right-wing terror. It was terrorism overshadowed by quasi civil war. See Heinz-Gerhardt Haupt and Klaus Weinbauer, "Terrorism and the State," in Donald Bloxham and Robert Gerwarth, eds., *Political Violence in Twenty-Century Europe*, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2011, pp. 176-209.

20. Jeffrey Kaplan, "The Fifth Wave: The New Tribalism?" *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 19, Iss. 4, 2007, pp. 545-570. See also Jeffrey Kaplan, "Terrorism's Fifth Wave: A Theory, a Conundrum and a Dilemma," *Perspectives on Terrorism*, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2008, available from terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/26/html.

21. No testing of such a hypothesis is known to exist. The author, however, can already see the utility of including the fifth terrorism wave as a typology coupled with an emerging form of insurgency—the Blood Cultist construct that will appear later in this paper—that was under development prior to this literature search of the forms of terrorism.

22. Daniel Byman, "Understanding Proto-Insurgencies," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 31, Iss. 2, 2008, pp. 165-200.

23. See Michael Miklaucic and Jacqueline Brewer, eds., *Convergence: Illicit Networks and National Security in the Age of Globalization*, Washington, DC: NDU Press, 2013, available from ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/Books/convergence.pdf; James J.F. Forrest, ed., *Intersections of Crime and Terror*, London: Routledge, 2013;

and Jennifer L. Hesterman, *The Terrorist-Criminal Nexus*, Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2013.

24. A more in depth analysis of these two insurgency forms can be found in John P. Sullivan and Robert J. Bunker, "Rethinking insurgency: criminality, spirituality, and societal warfare in the Americas," in Robert J. Bunker, ed., *Criminal Insurgencies in Mexico and the Americas*, London: Routledge, 2013, pp. 29-50.

25. Steven Metz, *The Future of Insurgency*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, December 10, 1993, available from strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB344.pdf.

26. *Ibid.*

27. *Ibid.*

28. Steven Metz, "A Flame Kept Burning: Counterinsurgency Support After the Cold War," *Parameters*, Vol. 25, No. 3, Autumn 1995, pp. 3, available from strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/Articles/1995/metz.htm.

29. *Ibid.* For the original source cited by Metz, see Larry Cable, "Reinventing the Round Wheel: Insurgency, Counter-Insurgency, and Peacekeeping Post Cold War," *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, Vol. 4, Iss. 2, Autumn 1993, p. 229.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 4.

31. Chistopher Clapham, "Introduction: Analysing African Insurgencies," in Christopher Clapham, ed., *African Guerrillas*, Oxford: James Currey, 1998, pp. 6-7.

32. Jakkie Cilliers, "Resource wars—a new type of insurgency," in Jakkie Cilliers and Christian Dietrich, eds., *Angola's War Economy: The Role of Oil and Diamonds*, Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2000, p. 3, available from iss.co.za/pubs/books/angola.html.

33. *Ibid.*, pp. 4-5.

34. Stephen Sloan, "The Changing Face of Insurgency in the Post-Cold War Era: Doctrinal and Operational Implications," in Anthony James Joes, ed., *Saving Democracies: U.S. Intervention in Threatened Democratic States*, Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999, p. 73.

35. William G. Thom, "Congo-Zaire's 1996-97 Civil War in the Context of Evolving Patterns of Military Conflict in Africa in the Era of Independence," *The Journal of Conflict Studies*, Vol. 19, No. 2, Fall 1999, available from <https://journals.lib.unb.ca/index.php/JCS/article/view/4358/5015>.

36. These leading insurgency theorists are Metz (*spiritual* and *commercial*), Clapham (*reform*), and Thom (*economic*). Ian F.W. Beckett, *Modern Insurgencies and Counter-insurgencies: Guerrillas and Their Opponents Since 1750*, London: Routledge, 2001, p. 237.

37. *Ibid.*, pp. 70-85, 121-150.

38. *Ibid.*, pp. 151-216.

39. To this discussion is added the typology of Bard O'Neill (covered later in this monograph), and Sloan (*apolitical*). Some useful comparisons and contrasts of the insurgency forms are also made, such as between the Metz (*spiritual*) and O'Neill (*traditionalist*) forms. Ian Beckett, "The Future of Insurgency," *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, Vol. 16, Iss. 1, March 2005, pp. 22-31.

40. *Ibid.*, pp. 32-36.

41. David Kilcullen, "Countering Global Insurgency," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 28, Iss. 4, 2005, pp. 597-617, available from tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402390500300956.

42. Bard E. O'Neill, *Insurgency & Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse*, 2nd Ed., Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2005, pp. 19-23.

43. *Ibid.*, pp. 23-26.

44. *Ibid.*, p. 26.

45. *Ibid.*, pp. 26-29. Additionally, regarding Metz's commercial insurgency construct, subsequent works on this topic

appear from time-to-time by different authors. See Major Christopher Martinez, USA, "Mexico's Commercial Insurgency," *Military Review*, Vol. 92, No. 5, September/October 2012, pp. 58-62; and Oscar Palma, "Transnational networks of insurgency and crime: explaining the spread of commercial insurgencies beyond state borders," *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, Vol. 26, Iss. 3, 2015, pp. 476-496.

46. Steven Metz and Raymond Millen, *Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, November 2004, p. 2, available from strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=586.

47. *Ibid.*

48. Steven Metz, *Rethinking Insurgency*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, June 2007, p. 28.

49. Timothy L. Thomas, "Cyber Mobilization: A Growing Counterinsurgency Campaign," *IO Sphere*, June 2006, available from fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/cyber-mobilization.pdf; and Timothy L. Thomas, "Chapter 18: Cyber Mobilization: The Neglected Aspect of Information Operations and Counterinsurgency Doctrine," in James J. F. Forest, ed., *Countering Terrorism and Insurgency in the 21st Century: International Perspectives, Volume 1, Strategic and Tactical Considerations*, Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2007, pp. 358-379, available from fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/documents/countering-terrorism.pdf.

50. In Thomas, "Cyber Mobilization: A Growing Counterinsurgency Campaign," Thomas cites the contribution of John Mackinley for his views on the "virtual arena of war" that has a virtual element related to insurgency. See John Mackinley, *Defeating Complex Insurgency*, White Hall Paper 64, London: RUSI, 2005, p. xii; and Audrey Kurth Cronin, "Cyber-Mobilization: The New *Levée en Masse*," *Parameters*, Vol. 46, No. 2, Summer 2006, pp. 77-87, available from spgia.gmu.edu/wp-content/uploads/PDFs/Audrey_Kurth_Cronin/cybermobilization.pdf. While the work does not contain the word "virtual," it has a number of similar themes to the Thomas paper with some assistance provided by T.X. Hammes.

51. Thomas, "Cyber Mobilization: A Growing Counterinsurgency Campaign."

52. David Betz, "The Virtual Dimension of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency," *Small Wars & Insurgencies*, Vol. 19, No. 4, 2008, pp. 520-521.

53. Stephen Sloan, *The Challenge of Nonterritorial and Virtual Conflicts: Rethinking Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism*, JSOU-Report 11-2, MacDill Air Force Base: Joint Special Operations University, 2011, p. 16, available from jsou.socom.mil/JSOU%20Publications/JSOU11-2sloanRethinkingCOIN_final.pdf.

54. Ibid., see note 40 referencing Stephen Sloan and Robert J. Bunker, "Threat Group Dual-Dimensional Cyberspace Operations," in *Red Teams and Counterterrorism Training*, Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, March 2011, pp. 130-132.

55. Steven Metz, "The Internet, New Media, and the Evolution of Insurgency," *Parameters*, Vol. 42, No. 3, Autumn 2012, p. 81.

56. See John P. Sullivan, "Transnational Gangs: The Impact of Third Generation Gangs in Central America," *Air & Space Power Journal – Spanish Edition*, Second Trimester, 2008, available from airpower.maxwell.af.mil/apjinternational/apj-s/2008/2tri08/sullivaneng.htm (English Version).

57. For background on these competing schools of thought, see Robert J. Bunker, "Introduction: the Mexican cartels—organized crime vs. criminal insurgency," in Robert J. Bunker, ed., *The Mexican Cartels, Special Issue of Trends in Organized Crime*, Vol. 16, Iss. 2, June 2013, pp. 129-137. Criminal insurgency edited works include a four part *Small Wars Journal – El Centro* anthology series published from 2012-2015 and a number of Routledge books on this subject matter. More mainstream authors such as Mexican drug war reporters have begun to use this conceptualization. See, for example, Ioan Grillo, *El Narco: Inside Mexico's Criminal Insurgency*, New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2011. The conceptualization is now being applied to foreign criminalized insurgencies such as in parts of Asia. See Octavian Manea, "The challenge of

hybrid insurgency in Southern Thailand," *Monitor Strategic*, Vol. 17, Iss. 1-2, 2015, pp. 43-56, available from mapn.ro/diepa/ispaim/files/ms122015_.pdf#page=43.

58. John P. Sullivan and Carlos Rosales, "Ciudad Juárez and Mexico's 'Narco-Culture' Threat," *Mexidata*, February 28, 2011, available from mexidata.info/id2952.html.

59. Matthew A. Lauder, *Religion and Resistance: Examining the Role of Religion in Irregular Warfare*, Toronto: Defence R&D Canada, Technical Notes: TN 2009-049, March 2009, p. 9, available from dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA501625%26Location=U2%26doc=GetTRDoc.pdf.

60. *Ibid.*, p. 11.

61. Additionally, it should be noted that Canadian counter-insurgency doctrine is said by Lauder to be "... broken-down into five general types; that of, (1) *anarchist insurgencies*, which seek to destroy the existing system of governance, (2) *egalitarian insurgencies*, which involve mass-uprising and seek the re-distribution of wealth, (3) *traditionalist insurgencies*, which seek the re-establishment of traditional value or belief systems (including traditional religion), (4) *separatist insurgencies*, which are wars of regional liberation or succession, and (5) *reformist insurgencies*, which are conflicts that fuse political, economic, and social reform with the struggle for autonomy." These insurgency forms fall within the various typologies presented by the scholars identified within this literature review. *Ibid.*, p. 6.

62. Charlie Tarr, "21st Century 'Resource Control' Insurgencies: The Case of the Niger Delta," *e-International Relations*, October 9, 2011, available from e-ir.info/2011/10/09/21st-century-resource-control-insurgencies-the-case-of-the-niger-delta/; and Mary Kaldor, *New & Old Wars*, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998.

63. Robert C. Jones, "Understanding Insurgency: The Conditions behind the Conflict," *Small Wars Journal*, October 1, 2011, available from smallwarsjournal.com/sites/default/files/868-jones_0.pdf.

64. As a result, applying these insurgency categories to the insurgency form tables in the next section will be difficult. Still, some attempts will be made in this regard.

65. John Robb, "Onward to a Hollow State," *Global Guerrillas*, September 22, 2008, available from globalguerrillas.typepad.com/globalguerrillas/2008/09/onward-to-a-hol.html; Nils Gilman, Jesse Goldhammer, and Steven Weber, eds., *Deviant Globalization: Black Market Economy in the 21st Century*, New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2011; David Rothkopf, *Superclass: The Global Power Elite and the World They Are Making*, New York: Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, 2008; and Chrystia Freeland, *Plutocrats: The Rise of the New Global Super-Rich and the Fall of Everyone Else*, New York: Penguin Books, 2012.

66. Robert J. Bunker, "Plutocratic Insurgency," *Small Wars Journal*, September 6, 2012, available from smallwarsjournal.com/blog/plutocratic-insurgency.

67. Robert J. Bunker, "Chapter 6: Public looting for private gain: Predatory capitalism, MNCs and global elites, and plutocratic insurgency," in Robert J. Bunker and Pamela Ligouri Bunker, eds., *Global Criminal and Sovereign Free Economies and the Demise of the Western Democracies: Dark Renaissance*, London: Routledge, 2015, pp. 137-139.

68. Seth G. Jones and Patrick B. Johnson, "The Future of Insurgency," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol. 36, Iss. 1, 2013, p. 1.

69. These coming potentials have been indirectly addressed in various works over the years with the increasing Chinese economic expansion into Africa, Latin America, and other regions of the world. See, for instance, Horace Campbell, "China in Africa: challenging US global hegemony," *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 29, Iss. 1, 2008, pp. 89-105.

70. Jones and Johnson, p. 2.

71. Michael Rectenwald, "The Singularity and Socialism," *Insurgent Notes: Journal of Communist Theory and Practice*, October 5, 2013, available from insurgentnotes.com/2013/10/the-singularity-and-socialism/.

72. Nils Gilman, "Foreword: The twin insurgency—facing plutocrats and criminals," in Robert J. Bunker and Pamela Ligouri Bunker, eds., *Global Criminal and Sovereign Free Economies and the Demise of the Western Democracies: Dark Renaissance*, London: Routledge, 2015, pp. 1-17. This foreword was released while the book was going to publication. See Nils Gilman, "The Twin Insurgency," *The American Interest*, Vol. 9, No. 6, June 15, 2014, available from the-american-interest.com/2014/06/15/the-twin-insurgency/.

73. Kilcullen notes that, in his 2003 (2004) *Small Wars Journal* work, "Countering Global Insurgency," he initially said that we should consider insurgencies as biological systems. David Kilcullen, *Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerilla*, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. 27-51, 125-127, and 131-132.

74. John P. Sullivan and Adam Elkus, "Postcard from Mumbai: Modern Urban Siege," *Small Wars Journal*, February 16, 2009, available from smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/postcard-from-mumbai.

75. Albrecht Schnabel and Rohan Gunaratna, eds., *Wars From Within: Understanding and Managing Insurgent Movements*, Insurgency & Terrorism Series, Vol. 4, London: Imperial College Press, 2015, p. vii.

76. See Chapters 2-4 of *ibid.*, pp. 33-118.

77. Metz meant this insurgency form to be utilized in today's world wherein an insurgent organization is too weak to engage in simultaneous proto-state creation and state destruction so that organization must engage in a sequential process instead. In this historical case, the initial process of state destruction is the same, it is just that the anarchists simply have no desire to create a follow on state of their own.

78. "Domestic Terrorism Anarchist Extremism: A Primer," Federal Bureau of Investigation, November 16, 2010, available from https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2010/november/anarchist_111610/anarchist_111610.

79. Max G. Manwaring, *Venezuela's Hugo Chávez, Bolivarian Socialism, and Asymmetric Warfare*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, October 2005, available from strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB628.pdf.

80. Douglas Farah, "The Advance of Radical Populist Doctrine in Latin America: How the Bolivarian Alliance is Remaking Militaries, Dismantling Democracy and Combatting the Empire," *Prism*, Vol. 5, No. 3, 2015, pp. 91-105, available from cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/prism/prism_5-3/The_Advance_Of_Radical_Populist_Doctrine_in_Latin_America.pdf.

81. The group is a fusion of the pre-existing Amal militia and 1,500 Iranian Revolutionary Guard members. See Michael P. Arena, "Hezbollah's Global Criminal Operations," in Robert J. Bunker, ed., special double issue *Global Crime* on "Criminal-States and Criminal-Soldiers," Vol. 7, Iss. 3-4, August/November 2006, pp. 456-457.

82. Author's email correspondence with Steven Metz, October 7, 2015.

83. Author's email correspondence with Nils Gilman, July 13, 2015.

84. Steven Metz is skeptical of Russia as being able to engage in insurgency beyond what it considers lost territory. Russia is simply now a nation drawing upon a nationalistic identity and no longer a leader of a transnational ideology that previously allowed it to cooperate with and support revolutionary movements found in various parts of the world. Metz is not convinced that Russia can utilize simple "anti-Americanism" as a sufficiently strong replacement ideology to solidify its ties to insurgent movements. Author's email correspondence with Steven Metz, October 7, 2015.

85. For more on Russian hybrid warfare, see Mark Galeotti, "Moscow's Spy Game Why Russia Is Winning the Intelligence War in Ukraine," *Foreign Affairs*, October 30, 2014, available from <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2014-10-30/moscows-spy-game>; and Mark Galeotti, "'Hybrid War' and 'Little

Green Men': How It Works, and How It Doesn't," *e-International Relations*, April 16, 2015, available from e-ir.info/2015/04/16/hybrid-war-and-little-green-men-how-it-works-and-how-it-doesnt/.

86. The term "pure strain human (PSH)" may have first appeared in the *Gamma World* and *Metamorphosis Alpha* fantasy game series of the later 1970s. It is meant to represent a human that has not been genetically modified or changed by means of bio-implants (wetware).

87. See some of the debates concerning the place of religion in insurgency in Sullivan and Bunker, "Rethinking insurgency: criminality, spirituality, and societal warfare in the Americas," p. 37.

88. See, for instance, Ryan Mauro, "The Islamic State Seeks the Battle of the Apocalypse," *Clarion Project*, November 18, 2014, available from clarionproject.org/analysis/dabiq-islamic-state-wants-battle-end-days; and Graeme Wood, "What ISIS Really Wants," *The Atlantic*, March 2015, available from theatlantic.com/features/archive/2015/02/what-isis-really-wants/384980/.

89. Examples of such indoctrination can be seen in Aaron Y. Zelin, "New video message from The Islamic State: 'Cubs of the Caliphate' - Wilāyat Dijlah," *Jihadology*, July 22, 2015, available from jihadology.net/2015/07/22/new-video-message-from-the-islamic-state-cubs-of-the-caliphate-wilayat-dijlah/; "ISIS Child Executes 2 Russian Spies," *LiveLeak*, January 13, 2015, available from live-leak.com/view?i=3f9_1421187315; and Josiah Hooper, "Generation Z: Child Soldiers of the Zetas," *Reveal*, The Center for Investigative Reporting, November 5, 2014, available from <https://www.revealnews.org/article-legacy/generation-z-child-soldiers-of-the-zetas/>.

90. See Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1977; Jorg Friedrichs, "The Meaning of New Medievalism," *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 7, No. 4, 2001, pp. 475-502; and Phil Williams, *From the New Middle Ages to a New Dark Age: The Decline of the State and U.S. Strategy*, Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, June 2008, available from strategicstudies-institute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=867.

91. The U.S. Army's "megacities issue" insurgency research focus was brought to the attention of the author by Steven Metz. Author's email correspondence with Steven Metz, October 7 and 8, 2015. See Chief of Staff of the Army, Strategic Studies Group, Megacities Concept Team, *Megacities and the United States Army*, Washington, DC: June 2014, available from army.mil/e2/c/downloads/351235.pdf; and William G. Adamson, "Megacities and the US Army," *Parameters*, Vol. 45, No. 1, Spring 2015, pp. 45-54, available from strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/Parameters/Issues/Spring_2015/7_AdamsonWilliam_Megacities%20and%20the%20US%20Army.pdf. For Metz's recent observations on the fracturing of the present "COIN (counterinsurgency) myth" based on how Western style governments will supplant informal or traditional systems of order, see Steven Metz, "Shifting the Paradigm of America's Fight With Extremism," *World Politics Review*, October 9, 2015, available from worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/16904/shifting-the-paradigm-of-america-s-fight-with-extremism.

92. See Mackinley, *Defeating Complex Insurgency*; and Cronin, "Cyber-Mobilization: The New *Levée en Masse*."

93. Author's email correspondence with Steven Metz, October 7, 2015.

94. "China's Initiatives on Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road," *Xinhuanet*, 2014-Current (as of 6 August 2015), available from xinhuanet.com/english/special/silkroad/; "Chronology of China's Belt and Road Initiative," *Xinhuanet*, March 28, 2015, available from news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-03/28/c_134105435.htm; Bhaskar Chakravorti, "China's New Development Bank Is a Wake-Up Call for Washington," *Harvard Business Review*, April 20, 2015, available from <https://hbr.org/2015/04/chinas-new-development-bank-is-a-wake-up-call-for-washington>; "The dragon and the gringo: Latin America's shifting geopolitics," *The Economist*, January 17, 2015, available from economist.com/news/americas/21639549-latin-americas-shifting-geopolitics-dragon-and-gringo; and Patrick Gillespie, "China's big chess move against the U.S.: Latin America," *CNN Money*, March 4, 2015, available from money.cnn.com/2015/03/04/news/economy/china-latin-america-relations-united-states/.

95. Kathleen Caulderwood, "China Is Africa's New Colonial Overlord, Says Famed Primate Researcher Jane Goodall," *International Business Times*, February 18, 2014, available from ibtimes.com/china-africas-new-colonial-overlord-says-famed-primate-researcher-jane-goodall-1556312. One million Chinese nationals are now in Africa though direct investment still lags behind a number of nations. "China in Africa: One among many – China has become big in Africa. Now for the backlash," *The Economist*, January 17, 2015, available from economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21639554-china-has-become-big-africa-now-backlash-one-among-many.

96. For a critique of the second order effects related to anxiety surrounding strategic competition, see Bonnie S. Glaser, "Pivot to Asia: Prepare for Unintended Consequences," Center for Strategic and International Studies, Part of the 2012 Global Forecast, April 13, 2012, available from csis.org/publication/pivot-asia-prepare-unintended-consequences.

97. One of the fertile areas for such insurgency potentials is in coordination with leftist regimes such as Maduro's regime in Venezuela tied into the Bolivarian Alliance. See Farah, "The Advance of Radical Populist Doctrine in Latin America: How the Bolivarian Alliance is Remaking Militaries, Dismantling Democracy and Combatting the Empire."

98. Author's email correspondence with Steven Metz, October 7, 2015.

99. See "Autonomous Weapons: an Open Letter from AI & Robotics Researchers," Future of Life Institute, July 28, 2015-Current (as of 6 August 2015), available from futureoflife.org/AI/open_letter_autonomous_weapons; and Rinie van Est et al., *Intimate technology: The battle for our body and behaviour*, The Hague: Rathenau Instituut, January 2014, available from rathenau.nl/uploads/tx_tferathenau/Intimate_Technology_-_the_battle_for_our_body_and_behaviourpdf_01.pdf.

100. The Three Laws are: 1) A robot may not injure a human being or, through inaction, allow a human being to come to harm; 2) A robot must obey the orders given it by human beings, except where such orders would conflict with the First Law; and, 3) A robot must protect its own existence as long as such protection does

not conflict with the First or Second Laws. Initially published by Isaac Asimov, "Runaround," *Astounding Science Fiction*, March 1942, pp. 94-103. The first *Terminator* movie was directed by James Cameron and came out in 1984. The series has significantly influenced popular perceptions of the future threat posed by rogue AI and killer robots.

101. Projections concerning the future merging of humans and computers have been made for years now. See, for example, Sharon Guadin, "Intel: Human and computer intelligence will merge in 40 years," *Computerworld*, July 23, 2008, available from computerworld.com/article/2532164/computer-hardware/intel-human-and-computer-intelligence-will-merge-in-40-years.html; and Lev Grossman, "2045: The Year Man Becomes Immortal," *Time*, February 10, 2011, available from content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,2048299,00.html.

102. Author's email correspondence with Steven Metz, October 7, 2015.

103. Law enforcement have high anti-corruption capability but limited land warfare capability. For the synergies of using law enforcement and military forces against terrorists and insurgents, see Robert J. Bunker, "Defeating Violent Nonstate Actors," *Parameters*, Vol. 43, No. 4, Winter 2013-2014, pp. 57-65, available from strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/parameters/issues/Winter_2013/6_Bunker.pdf.

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